(1) 95-1576

No. _____

Supreme Court, U.S.
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In The
Supreme Court Of The United States
October Term, 1995

JOAN S. BORAWICK,
Petitioner

v.

MORRIE SHAY AND CHRISTINE SHAY,
Respondents

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
(WITH ATTACHED APPENDICES)

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether Certiorari Should Be Granted To Decide A Compelling Question of Public Importance, Regarding The Ability To Testify Chronologically Following Therapeutic Hypnosis, Being A Question Left Undecided By This Court In *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), And A Question Needing Resolution To Settle A Conflict Among Circuits in Light of This Court's Decisions in *Rock* and *Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)?

II. Whether Certiorari Should Be Granted To Determine If The Court of Appeals For The Second Circuit Violated The Due Process Clause of The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution In The Methodology Used to Bar The Petitioner's Testimony Chronologically Following Hypnosis, When Hypnosis Was Appropriate For The Memory Loss Involved, Was Used For Therapeutic Purposes, and the Hypnotist Added No New Elements To The Petitioner's Memory?

III. Whether Certiorari Should Be Granted To Determine If The Court of Appeals For The Second Circuit Violated The Seventh Amendment Right To A Jury Trial In Suits At Common Law In The Methodology Used To Bar The Petitioner's Testimony Without Full Discovery And An Evidentiary Hearing?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED i

TABLE OF CONTENTS ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES v

OPINIONS BELOW 2

JURISDICTION 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . . 13

I. Certiorari Should Be Granted To Answer A Question Of Compelling Public Importance Left Undecided By This Court in *Rock v. Arkansas* and To Resolve A Conflict Among Circuits In Light of *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals* . . . 13

II. Certiorari Should Be Granted To Resolve Important Federal Constitutional Issues 28

CONCLUSION 30

APPENDIX

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Filed October 17, 1995 . . . . . 1A-32A

Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Filed October 17, 1995 . . . . . 33A-34A

Denial of Petition for Rehearing
Filed December 29, 1995 . . . . . 35A

Ruling of the United States
District Court for the District of
Connecticut on Defendants' Motion
For Judgment On The Pleadings 36A-44A

Ruling of the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut on Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment 45A-46A

Judgment of the United States
District Court for the District
of Connecticut Dated May 10, 1994 . . . . . 47A

Federal Rules of Evidence 412,
28 U.S.C. 48A

42 U.S.C §13981 . . . . . 49A-50A

California Penal Code §667.83 . . . . . 51A-52A

Idaho Code §18-1506A 53A-54A

Illinois Revised Statute §5/12-33 . . . . . 55A-56A

Louisiana Revised Statutes §14:107.1 . . . . . 57A-58A

Montana Code Ann. §27-2-217 . . . . . 59A

Montana Code Ann. §45-5-627 . . . . . 60A-61A

Affidavit 62A-65A

Card dated December 24, 1994 . . . . . 66A

Lawyer Charged With Negligent Homicide In Sumner Girl's Death, Enumclaw Courier-Herald, August 9, 1973 . . . . . 67A-68A

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Armstrong v Young, 34 F.3d 421 (7th Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 115 S. Ct. 1369 (1995) 20

Aquino v Stone, 957 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1992) 25

Beacon Theaters v Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) 29

Beck v Norris, 801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986) 19

Borawick v Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501 (D.Conn. 1994) . . . . . passim

Borawick v Shay, 68 F.3rd 597 (2d Cir. 1995) . . . . . passim

Boykin v Leapley, 28 F.3d 788 (8th Cir. 1994) 20

Chaussard v Fulcomer, 816 F.2d 925 (3rd Cir. 1987), *cert. denied* 484 U.S. 845 (1987) 19

Childs v Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983) 25

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Cruzan v Director, MDH, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) 28

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Franklin v Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435 (N.D. Calif. 1995) 13, 24

Frye v United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) . . 9, 18

Gagnon v Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) 14

Goldberg v Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) 14

Hodges v Easton, 106 U.S. 408 (1882) 29

Hoult v Hoult, 57 F.3rd 1 (1st Cir. 1995) 24

Howard v United States, 864 F. Supp. 1019
(D. Colo. 1994) 25

Idaho v Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) 22

Kline v Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067
(9th Cir. 1975) 11, 13, 19

Matthews v Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) 28

McCorkle v Johnson, 881 F.2d 993 (11th Cir. 1989) 25

McQueen v Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987)
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944 (1987) 20, 21

Mills v Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982) 28

Morrissey v Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) 14

Rock v Arkansas, 484 U.S. 44 (1987) 10, 11, 13, 14
. . . . . 16, 17, 18, 27

Roe v Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 28

Sprynczynatyk v General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d
1112 (8th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*,
475 U.S. 1046 (1986) 20, 21

United States v Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 885 (1979) 19

United States v Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969) 19

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White v Ieyoub, 25 F.3d 245 (5th Cir. 1994) 20, 21

Woodell v IBEW, 502 U.S. 93 (1991) 29

Wyller v Fairchild Hill Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir 1974) 19

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Rutledge v Gulian, 459 A.2d 680 (N.J. 1983) 26

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Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Const. amend. V 3, 28

U.S. Const. amend. VII 3, 29, 30

Federal Statutes:

28 U.S.C. §412 . . . . . 3, 12, 26

28 U.S.C. §601 . . . . . 3, 29, 30

28 U.S.C. §1254 3

28 U.S.C. §1332 5

28 U.S.C. §2072 29

42 U.S.C. §13981 . . . . . 4, 28

State Statutes:

California Penal Code §667.83 (1995) 4, 24

Connecticut General Stat. §54-86h 4, 30

Idaho Code, Vol. 4, Crimes §18-1506A 4, 16, 24

Illinois Revised Stat. 5/12-33 . . . . . 4, 16, 24

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

JOAN S. BORAWICK, Petitioner

v.

MORRIE SHAY AND CHRISTINE SHAY, Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

The Petitioner, Joan S. Borawick, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in *Borawick v. Shay*, 68 F.3rd 597 (2d Cir. 1995) (*see* Petitioner's Appendix at 1A-32A, hereinafter "App. ___").

OPINIONS BELOW

On October 17, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its opinion affirming the decision of the District Court. The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 68 F.3rd 597 (2d Cir. 1995). The court of appeals denial of this petitioner's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc* is reproduced in Petitioner's Appendix at 35A.

The *in limine* rulings of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, barring the Petitioner's testimony, are reported at 842 F. Supp. 1501 (D. Conn. 1994). The unreported summary judgment ruling in favor of the Respondents is reproduced at Appendix 45A. An opinion denying the Respondents' previous motion for judgment is reproduced at Appendix 36A and is also reported at 1993 WL 127087 (D. Conn. 1993).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered judgment on October 17, 1995. On December 29, 1995 it denied this Petitioner's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing *en banc*. In accordance with Rule 13(3), the time for filing this petition for writ of certiorari runs from the December 29, 1995 denial of the petition for rehearing.

Petitioner invokes the certiorari jurisdiction conferred on the Court by 28 U.S.C.§1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Constitution of the United States, Amendment V: Capital crimes; double jeopardy; self-incrimination; due process; just compensation for property

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

Constitution of the United States, Amendment VII:

In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

STATUTES

Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 412, 28 U.S.C.

The text of this statute is in the Appendix at 48A *et seq.*

TITLE 28, UNITED STATES CODE, § 1254: § 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari; appeal; certified questions

Cases in the court of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree...

Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 601, 28 U.S.C.
General Rule of Competency

Every person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.

Title 42, United States Code, §13981 Civil rights
The text of this statute is in the Appendix at 49A *et seq.*

CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE §667.83 (1995)
Ritual abuse; Sentence enhancement
The text of this statute is in the Appendix at 51A *et seq.*

CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES §52-577d
Limitation of action for damages to minor caused by sexual abuse, exploitation or assault. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by such person later than seventeen years from the date such person attains the age of majority.

CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTES §54-86h
Competency of child as witness. No witness shall be automatically adjudged incompetent to testify because of age and any child who is a victim of assault, sexual assault or abuse shall be competent to testify without prior qualification. The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witness shall be for the determination of the trier of fact.

IDAHO CODE, VOL. 4, CRIMES §18-1506A (1994)
Ritualized abuse of a child; exclusions; penalties; definition
See, Appendix at 53A *et seq.*

ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, Chapter 720,
Section 5/12-33; Ritualized abuse of a child
See, Appendix at 55A *et seq.*

LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES ANN. §14:107.1 (1995)
Ritualistic Acts *See*, Appendix at 57A *et seq.*

MONTANA CODE ANN. §27-2-217 (1994)
Tort actions - ritual abuse of minor
See, Appendix at 59A.

MONTANA CODE ANN. §45-5-627 (1994)
Ritual abuse of minor; exceptions; penalty.
See, Appendix at 60A *et seq.*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This petition concerns the circumstances under which a party in a civil case can testify after therapeutic hypnosis, and whether this Petitioner's constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial have been violated. The district court summarily disposed of the Petitioner's diversity case, filed in the district court in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1332, without full discovery, an evidentiary hearing or trial, following an *in limine* ruling barring the Petitioner from testifying in her own case chronologically following therapeutic hypnosis. Judgment for the Respondents was affirmed by the court of appeals.

The Petitioner, Joan S. Borawick, a citizen of the State of California, filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut on January 24, 1992 naming the Respondents, Morrie Shay and Christine Shay, her maternal uncle and aunt. The complaint alleges that the Respondents, Connecticut citizens, sexually abused the Petitioner in Connecticut at the Respondents' home in 1961 and 1964 when the Petitioner was age 4 and 7.

The Petitioner suffered from traumatic psychogenic amnesia until age 32, when on the Wednesday during the second week of February, 1989 a memory of sexual abuse involving her deceased father began to emerge while she was driving her car. *Borawick*, 842 F.Supp. 1501, 1502 (D. Conn. 1994). The Petitioner's father had long since been deceased, having died in 1973 shortly after killing a seventeen year old girl in a motor vehicle accident. App.

67A. Following this initial conscious recollection in February of 1989 of child sexual abuse by her father, a nonparty, subsequent memories of sexual abuse surfaced over the ensuing months and years. App. 4A-5A.

The Petitioner's first disturbing conscious memory concerning the Respondents was of a physical assault of a nonsexual nature by Christine Shay emerging as a flashback two days after the first memory concerning her father, on Friday, February 10, 1989 while the petitioner was in her apartment. *Borawick*, 842 F. Supp. at 1502-1503. That same evening, while alone in her apartment, the Petitioner recalled that the Respondent, Christine Shay, vaginally raped her with an object. App. 5A. Several weeks later, she began treating with Judy Hirsch, M.A., M.F.C.C., a marriage, family and child counselor, for anxiety, panic, and depression associated with the memories of childhood sexual abuse. The Petitioner was also later treated by a clinical psychologist, Carol Waldschmidt, Ph.D. who diagnosed her, in accordance with the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM-III, with severe chronic Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified.

The Petitioner had additional memories of sexual abuse by her aunt of a severe and heinous nature, later in 1989, in 1990 and in 1991. The Petitioner's first and only adult memory of having been sexually assaulted by the Respondent Morrie Shay, emerged in 1990. Id.

On January 24, 1992, the Petitioner commenced this action against the Respondents seeking compensatory and punitive damages for sexual assault, molestation and exploitation of her at ages 4 and 7. App. 5A. The complaint requested a jury trial. In accordance with a then existing standing order, discovery was to be completed within six months, by July 24, 1992. On July 17, 1992, the Petitioner filed a timely motion to enlarge the time for discovery expressing the need to depose out-of-state witnesses in Washington, where other family members reside, and California, where the Petitioner resides, and has been treated. Although the Respondents had no objection to the timely motion to enlarge, the

district court denied the motion on July 23, 1992. App. 5A.

The Petitioner disclosed to the Respondents that she had seen a hypnotist in 1987 and 1988 on her medical doctor's recommendation for relief from chronic fatigue and stress. In November of 1992, over three months after the discovery deadline had expired and six months after the initial disclosure that the Petitioner had seen a hypnotist, the Respondents filed a motion *in limine* seeking exclusion of all of the Petitioner's testimony on the basis that it was "hypnotically refreshed". App. 5A. The Respondents offered no expert affidavits in support of their motion. The Petitioner objected, among other reasons, based upon the incomplete state of the record, and the non-expert characterization of her memories occurring in 1989, 1990, 1991, months and years after the hypnosis, as "hypnotically refreshed". The motion *in limine* and Petitioner's objection were referred by the district judge to Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer Margolis. Id.

While the motion *in limine* and objection were pending, and before any decision was issued by the Magistrate Judge, on February 10, 1993 the Petitioner filed a second motion to enlarge the time for discovery, requesting leave to take out-of-state depositions "for purposes of a pretrial hearing on defendants' motion *in limine*". This second motion for enlargement was objected to by the Respondents and not ruled upon by the magistrate judge. App. 5A. The anticipated pretrial hearing was never conducted by the district court.

In her initial ruling on March 24, 1993, the magistrate judge adopted a four prong "safeguard test[1] for purposes of deciding the *in limine* motion, a component of which required corroborative evidence. The Petitioner was permitted to conduct the telephonic deposition of her hypnotist, Valerian St. Regis, who was then age 72, semi-retired, and residing in Alaska. *Borawick*, 842 F.Supp. 1505. The Petitioner's February 10, 1993 discovery motion to

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[1] The test required: 1) that the hypnotist be appropriately qualified; 2) that he or she avoid adding new elements to the subject's description 3) that a permanent record be available to ensure against suggestive procedures; and 4) that other evidence to corroborate the "hypnotically enhanced" testimony be offered.

take other depositions was not ruled upon by the Magistrate Judge. App. 5A.

The Petitioner filed written submissions, the videotaped deposition of the hypnotist, and the following corroborative evidence by expert affidavit: 1) an affidavit from Dr. Hirsch who treated the Petitioner after she began to recollect the sexual abuse; 2) an affidavit from Dr. Waldschmidt, the psychologist who also treated her after she began to recollect the sexual abuse; 3) and an affidavit from a clinical psychologist, Anthony Reading, Ph.D., who treated her in 1987, before the Petitioner regained her memories of child sexual abuse and before the hypnosis. Id. at 1506, n.1. All three affidavits opined that the Petitioner exhibited the characteristic traits and symptoms of a victim of incest and child sexual abuse. Dr. Waldschmidt further opined that the Petitioner met the DSM-III diagnoses for Psychogenic Amnesia, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, and Dissociative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified

The hypnosis occurred months, and with respect to some memories, years before the memories emerged. In his videotaped deposition, the hypnotist, Valerian St. Regis, testified that he had 10-12 hypnosis sessions with the Petitioner over a one year span from July of 1987 until fall of 1988 for the treatment of chronic illness and stress. During the last 3 sessions he used the hypnotic technique of age regression, taking the Petitioner back to her childhood. Id. 1507. While using regression, the hypnotist uncovered one incident of sexual abuse pertaining to the Petitioner's deceased father, and others involving the Respondents. Before and after these hypnosis sessions, the Petitioner had no conscious recollection of sexual abuse. App. 3A. The Petitioner left the sessions with no recollection of what transpired. App. 4A.

The hypnotist, St. Regis, further testified that he had over 50 years off and on experience in the use and study of hypnosis, had received a degree from the American Institute of Hypnotherapy in Santa Ana, California, was a member of the American Association of Professional Hypnotherapists, was registered in the 1993 National Register of Professional Hypnotherapists, had

attended numerous lectures on the subject of hypnosis, had lectured to court personnel at the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska on the subject of hypnosis for stress management, and lectured to psychology classes at the University of Alaska. In 1987 St. Regis was hired by the Pacific Medical Center in Los Angeles, where he worked under the supervision of Ronald Peters, M.D., a licensed medical doctor, and where he treated the Petitioner. St. Regis further testified that on the three occasions when he used hypnotic age regression on the Petitioner, he did not use any suggestions and asked: "what happened?", "what do you remember?", "what do you recall?". App. 4A.

Without ruling on Petitioner's February 10, 1993 discovery motion which sought leave to conduct depositions, and without conducting an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge issued a supplemental ruling on May 26, 1993 recommending granting Respondents' motion *in limine* on the ground that the hypnotist was not "appropriately qualified". The magistrate judge also concluded: "...[t]here is no need to address the issue of corroborative evidence". App. 9A. The initial and supplemental rulings made two factual findings, not objected to by the Respondents: 1) "that hypnosis was appropriate for the memory loss involved"; and 2) "based upon St. Regis' deposition testimony, there is no indication that St. Regis added new elements to Plaintiff's description while under hypnosis". App. 8A-9A.

While Petitioner's objections to the magistrate judge's initial and supplemental rulings were pending before the district judge, this court decided *Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). The Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the in limine rulings because of the magistrate judge's reliance upon forensic hypnosis precedents relying upon the *Frye*[2] test for the admissibility of scientific evidence. The motion for reconsideration argued that the therapeutic hypnosis satisfied *Daubert*, without the imposition of additional safeguards as a precondition to the admissibility of testimony chronologically following its use. App. 6A. As additional corroboration, the

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[2] Frye v United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

Petitioner submitted, in accordance with Fed. R. Evid. 104a, two letters received from her younger sister in 1989, and predating the lawsuit by more than two years. Both letters referenced sexual assaults of the younger sister, and one expressly identified the Respondents as the perpetrators. App. 6A. The Petitioner also submitted additional expert affidavits, one from a board-certified psychiatrist, Matthew Klein M.D., and one from a clinical and forensic psychologist, Anne Pratt, Ph.D., both of which stated that the therapeutic use of hypnosis is widely accepted in the mental health community. App. 6A. The affidavits further stated that it was not common in the mental health therapeutic community to videotape or audiotape therapeutic sessions, as such could itself be highly suggestive. At no time did the Respondents offer *any* expert affidavits in support of their motion *in limine*.

Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge adhered to her earlier ruling barring the Petitioner from testifying in her own case. App. 6A. The district court judge adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations, and the Respondents moved for summary judgment. App. 6A-7A. In recommending summary judgment, the magistrate judge commented: "this result is an unfortunate one in that plaintiff apparently has been unable to develop any independent evidence (such as the testimony of her sister) to corroborate her claims". App. 45A. Upon receipt of this ruling, the Petitioner then filed another motion to reopen discovery and renewed her motion to reopen discovery dated February 10, 1993. The motion was supported by an affidavit of the Petitioner recounting how her sister had, "on at least twenty occasions from 1989 through 1993" told the Petitioner she was violently sexually assaulted by the Respondents' and that a third family member also informed the Petitioner that she had been sexually abused by the Respondent Morrie Shay. The motion to reopen was retained by the district judge, and denied. Final judgment was entered in favor of the Respondents and appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. App. 7A.

The court of appeals recognized the issue before it was left undecided by this Court in *Rock v Arkansas*, 484 U.S. 44 (1987), acknowledging *Rock*, "explicitly limited the reach of its holding

by refusing to express an opinion as to the appropriate rule of admissibility 'of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants'." App. 18A, quoting *Rock*, 484 U.S. at 58, n.15. The court of appeals also acknowledged the conflict of authority in those cases where hypnosis is used as a forensic or investigative tool: "[t]he state and federal courts that have been faced with the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony have followed four different approaches". App. 16A-21A. The court of appeals noted that "the law continues to be in a state of flux regarding the reception of hypnotically-enhanced testimony". App. 21A.

The court of appeals recognized that even in the forensic context, when hypnosis is used for investigative purposes for the events being litigated, "some courts treat all such testimony as admissible under the theory that hypnosis does not render the witness incompetent, but goes to the question of credibility", citing among other cases, the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Kline v Ford Motor Co.*, 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975), a civil case where investigative hypnosis was used. App. 16A. Despite this conflicting authority, the court of appeals nonetheless adopted a "nonexclusive" multi-factored approach which it claimed was similar to that adopted by the Eighth and Fourth Circuits and the Idaho Supreme Court in cases all decided before this court decided *Rock* and *Daubert*.

The test adopted by the court of appeals included consideration of a "non-exclusive" set of factors, some of which it listed: 1) an evaluation of the purpose of the hypnosis, whether investigative or therapeutic; 2) whether the subject received any suggestions from the hypnotist or others prior to or during the hypnosis; 3) the presence or absence of a permanent record, which can help the court ascertain whether suggestive procedures were used, ideally the sessions should be videotaped or audiotaped; 4) whether the hypnotist was appropriately qualified by training in psychology or psychiatry; 5) whether corroborating evidence exists to support the reliability of the hypnotically refreshed memories; 6) evidence of the subject's hypnotizability may also be relevant; and 7) consideration of expert evidence offered by the parties as to the reliability of the procedures used.

App. 26A-27A.

The "nonexclusive" test adopted by the court of appeals, permitted review of the *content* of the Petitioner's memories of sexual abuse. The court of appeals determined, without viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Petitioner on review of a summary judgment, that the Petitioner's recollections of multiperpetrator abuse concerning individuals outside of the case were "fanciful" and "far-fetched". App. 29A-30A. The district court conducted no Fed. R. Evid. 412 rape shield hearing to determine the relevancy of these allegations involving nonparties and unrelated to the hypnosis. The court of appeals assessed the credibility of the claims in applying its test and concluded: "[t]hat Borawick has made these *far-fetched*, uncorroborated accusations against others, in addition to the defendants, erodes our confidence in the allegations against Morrie and Christine Shay and properly *weighs* against the admissibility of her hypnotically-induced memories". Id. Although finding that "it would have been more appropriate for the district judge to have conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to issuing his ruling", the court of appeals did not remand Petitioner's case to the district court to allow her to meet its test or for a rape shield hearing. App. 28A.

The Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc with the court of appeals with an addendum including: 1) a redacted affidavit from a third victim, dated September 6, 1994, obtained while this case was pending in the court of appeals, stating that the affiant was sexually assaulted by the Respondent Morrie Shay at age nine (App. 62A); 2) a Christmas card received by the Petitioner from her younger sister in December of 1994 with a postscript stating "Uncle Morrie and Aunt Chris did rape me when I was little also Joan, and I do not care if they disown me or hate me, your sister [name omitted]" (App. 66A); 3) a newspaper article from August 9, 1973 about the Petitioner's father, entitled *Lawyer Charged With Negligent Homicide in Sumner Girl's Death*, Enumclaw Courier-Herald, (App. 67A); and other information. The court of appeals denied the petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc on December 29, 1995.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO DECIDE A QUESTION LEFT UNDECIDED BY *ROCK V ARKANSAS* AND TO SETTLE A CONFLICT AMONG CIRCUITS IN LIGHT OF THIS COURT'S DECISIONS IN *ROCK* AND *DAUBERT V MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS*

As the Second Circuit acknowledged, its decision in this case was left undecided by this Court in *Rock v Arkansas*, 484 U.S. 44, 58, n.15 and conflicts with the Ninth Circuit's decision in *Kline v Ford Motor Co.*, 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975) and with *United States v Waksal*, 539 F.Supp. 834, (S.D. Fla. 1982), *rev'd on other grounds*, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir 1983). App. 18A and 16A.

Left undecided by *Rock* are the circumstances under which individuals who have previously been hypnotized for therapeutic purposes, can testify in civil cases. Anyone who has undergone any form of therapeutic hypnosis may now have their ability to testify called into question. All witnesses testify from memory and "[b]y definition, trials are based on memories of the past". *Franklin v Duncan*, 884 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D. Calif. 1995). The implications of the court of appeal's decision are vast, disenfranchising many who have undergone therapeutic hypnosis, professionals who use hypnosis, victims of sexual abuse, victims of violent crimes, and other members of the public. Unlike the forensic precedents relied upon by the court of appeals, the Petitioner did not have any "refreshed recollection" of the sexual abuse for weeks, months, and with respect to some events, years, following the hypnosis.

In *Rock,* the Petitioner was charged with the shooting death of her husband and hypnotized for investigative purposes. In declaring unconstitutional the State of Arkansas' per se rule excluding hypnotically refreshed testimony, this court recognized a previously hypnotized criminal defendant's right to testify in under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. *Rock* held: "[a]t this point in our development of our adversary system,

it cannot be doubted that a defendant in a criminal case has the right to take the witness stand and to testify in his or her own defense". *Rock*, at 49. *Rock's* holding was limited to instances where hypnosis was used as an investigative tool to refresh the recollection of a criminal defendant: "[t]his case does not involve the admissibility of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants and we express no opinion on that issue". *Id.* at 58, n.15. This Court did significantly note, however, that the right to testify "reaches beyond the criminal trial: the procedural due process constitutionally required in some extrajudicial proceedings includes the right of the affected person to testify". *Id.* at 52, n.9, *citing*, *Gagnon v Scarpelli*, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); *Morrissey v Brewer*, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); *Goldberg v Kelly*, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).

Hypnosis has been recognized as a valuable therapeutic tool for decades. The American Medical Association endorsed hypnosis as a valid therapeutic technique in 1958. *Rock*, 483 U.S. at 59. The American Psychological Association endorsed its use in 1960. Hypnosis is used, by psychiatrists, psychologists, professional hypnotists, hypnotherapists, habit control specialists, anesthesiologists, obstetricians, oncologists, dentists, nurses, educators, attorneys, chiropractors, marriage family and child counselors, parole and probation officers, clinical social workers, athletic trainers, ministers and members of the clergy. Scheflin and Shapiro, *Trance on Trial*, p.6 (Guilford Press 1989). It has at least 83 applications in medicine, including its use for the treatment of alcoholism, cancer, epilepsy, hypertension, and many other conditions. Hammond, *Hypnotic Induction & Suggestion: An Introductory Manual*, p. 98 (The American Society of Clinical Hypnosis 1989). It has 72 applications in psychology and psychiatry and 17 uses in dentistry. *Id.* at 99-100. In addition, self-hypnosis tapes are widely available to the public in many bookstores as are self-hypnosis manuals. Hammond, *Manual For Self-Hypnosis*, (The American Society of Clinical Hypnosis 1989).

Coinciding with the widespread use of therapeutic hypnosis is the increased legal and societal concern over the prevalence of child sexual abuse. Bowman & Mertz, *A Dangerous Direction:*

Legal Intervention In Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 549, 593 (1996). Noting the increasing societal concern, this law review article finds the imposition of third-party liability against therapists legally unsound. Since 1989 nineteen states have adopted special statutes of limitations for childhood sexual abuse tort actions and many other jurisdictions have tolled their statute of limitations to preserve claims for adults who have traumatic amnesia for the abuse. Comment, *Recovered Memories of Childhood Sexual Abuse: The Admissibility Question*, 68 Temple L. Rev. 249, 257 (1995)[3], also see, Kanovitz, *Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials*, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1185, 1202-1203 (1992). The Connecticut legislature, recognized the "unique problems associated with the tort of sexual abuse" (App. 40A), and extended the statute of limitations to age 35, to enable victims of incest and child sexual abuse time to come to terms with the abuse and seek civil redress. C.G.S.§52-577d.

The American Medical Association, in its November 6, 1995 statement entitled "Sexual Assault in America", recognized that "[s]exual assault is one of the most serious and fastest growing violent crimes in America. The National Victim Center reports that over 700,000 women are raped or sexually assaulted annually. Of these, 61% are under the age of 18". The often-cited study, *Rape in America: A Report To The Nation*, prepared by the National Victim Center and Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center, determined that the majority of American rape victims (61%) are raped before the age of 18, and an astounding 29% of all forcible rapes occurred when the victim was less than eleven years old. This study estimated that as many as 3.8 million adult American women have had rape-related post-traumatic stress disorder. *Rape in America: A Report To The Nation*, p.7 (April 23, 1992).

Sexual assaults upon our young have reached epidemic proportions. Studies indicate that between one fifth to one third of all women have experienced sexual abuse in childhood. Williams, *Recall of Childhood Trauma: A Prospective Study of*

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[3] See this Comment for a critic of the approach used by the district court, repeated in the same determinative fashion by the court of appeals.

Women's Memories of Child Sexual Abuse, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, Vol 62, No.4, 1167 (1994). This prospective study of 129 women with documented histories of childhood sexual abuse found 38% of the participants did not report the abuse seventeen years later, and another 16%, who did recall the abuse, stated at some point in the past they had forgotten about it. The phenomenon of psychogenic amnesia has been documented in other empirical studies as well. *Supra*, 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 597-609.

Psychogenic amnesia, post-traumatic stress disorder and dissociative disorder, all psychological disorders recognized by the American Psychiatric Association, and all experienced by the Petitioner, are common psychological coping mechanisms for victims of child sexual abuse and sexual assault. 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 597-603; 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 1203-1209. Children who are repeatedly abused automatically learn to put themselves in a trance state during the abuse. 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 560. Spontaneous hypnosis is a defensive, dissociative mechanism symptomatic of sexual abuse.

Hypnosis of children and others, coupled with threats and severe physical abuse, fall within the more severe abuse, deemed "ritual abuse". States which have enacted legislation against ritual child abuse, define the crime to include the forced ingestion of narcotics and hallucinogens used to induce a hypnotic state. For example, see Idaho Code §18-1506A, Illinois Code §5/12-33, Louisiana Rev. Statute §14:107.1, and Montana Code §45.5-627. App.53A-60A. If the court of appeals decision is left to stand, it will condone exclusion of the testimony of victims of child sexual abuse and ritual abuse because they are victims. It is doubtful that the perpetrators of these more severe forms of multidimensional child sexual abuse are audiotaping and videotaping the abuse, or that they possess the necessary qualifications.

There have been numerous scientific studies on the subject of hypnosis, memory, and psychogenic amnesia since this court decided *Rock*. Just as it was erroneous for the court of appeals to extrapolate forensic hypnosis case law into the therapeutic setting, it is scientifically unsound to extrapolate studies of normal

memory for hypnotized and nonhypnotized subjects to a patient population with traumatic, affect-laden memories. One crucial flaw with the 1985 American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs Report cited in *Rock*, 483 U.S. at 59, is that the Council Report did not address the applications of hypnosis with memory in clinical situations involving abuse, or in forensic cases involving traumatic or highly affect-laden memory. Hammond, et al, *Clinical Hypnosis and Memory: Guidelines For Clinicians and For Forensic Hypnosis* (American Society of Ciinical Hypnosis Press, February 1995) (hereinafter "ASCH Guidelines").

The court of appeals, following forensic precedents pre-dating *Rock* and *Daubert*, erroneously relied upon a body of research performed by experimental researchers on *normal* memory for nonsense material, rather than studies on *traumatic memory* for significant, meaningful emotional memories. App. 10A-16A. Lacking any psychiatric expertise of its own, the court of appeals uncritically accepted the "constructionist" views of memory (App. 16A), without review of the studies conducted by trauma memory researchers. Brown, Scheflin & Hammond, *Memory, Trauma, Treatment & Law* (In Press). The flaw with the constructionist view is that the theory is derived from studies on normal memory processing and cannot readily be applied to traumatic memory. *Id.*

More current studies demonstrate that the majority of people in hypnosis, including highly hypnotizable subjects, do not mistake hypnotically suggested fantasies for actual events. ASCH Guidelines, p. 20. Also contrary to the common legal argument that hypnosis renders an individual immune to cross-examination, more recent studies also demonstrate that hypnotic techniques do not appear to immunize subjects against the effects of cross-examination. *Id.* at 22 citing Spanos et al., 1989; Spanos et al 1991. Significantly, it has been found that highly hypnotizable persons *in hypnosis* were no more vulnerable to the effects of leading questions than nonhypnotic highly hypnotizable persons. Sheehan, et al. (1993). In other words, the trait of hypnotizability was the distinguishing factor, not the hypnosis. Accordingly, there is a need for review by this court to assimilate more recent

scientific studies, post dating *Rock* so that lower courts do not mistakenly follow forensic precedents relying on research inapplicable to traumatic memory and decided under Frye.

Hypnosis is no more likely to contaminate memory than the ordinary processes recognized in eyewitness testimony, interrogative questioning, interviewing, or other aspects of suggestion already recognized by courts. ASCH Guidelines, p. 22 (1995). The ASCH panel concluded, based on the scientific evidence from numerous studies, "that contaminating effects on memory are no more likely to occur from the use of hypnosis than from many nonhypnotic interviewing and interrogative procedures. Therefore, legal rules that single out hypnosis for restrictive treatment are unwarranted". ASCH Guidelines, p. 22-23 (1995). The scientific literature supports a rule of admissibility for testimony chronologically following therapeutic hypnosis.

In the forensic setting, where hypnosis is used as an investigative tool, all Circuits have rejected a rule of per se inadmissibility[4] with the cases falling into one of three remaining categories: 1) the safeguard approach, considered insufficiently inflexible by the court of appeals (28A); 2) the totality-of-the circumstances approach, with varying factors of consideration; and 3) the *per se* rule of admissibility, which permits an individual to testify, be cross-examined or impeached on the fact of hypnosis, and allows introduction by both sides of expert testimony on the subject of hypnosis.

Even in a forensic context and in criminal cases where the confrontation clause has been invoked, a majority of the federal courts and many state courts hold post-hypnotic testimony admissible and allow the jury to determine its credibility and

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[4] The Second Circuit correctly noted that many courts adopting the per se inadmissible rule did so on the basis that the testimony does not meet the requirements of *Frye v United States*, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and that this position is now called into question by *Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede *Frye*. *Borawick*, 68 F.3d at 604, n.3. This view was followed in *Rowland v Kentucky*, 901 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Ky. 1995).

weight. 68 Temp. L. Rev. at 258. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a per se rule of admissibility, holding that the current recollections of witnesses whose memories have been refreshed by hypnosis are admissible, with the fact of hypnosis relevant to credibility and the weight to be given to the testimony by the trier of fact. This approach has been applied in civil and criminal cases. *United States v Awkard*, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 885 (1979); *Kline v Ford Motor Company*, 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); *Wyller v Fairchild Hill Corp.*, 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir. 1974).

Before the Second Circuit's decision in this case, its only prior decision on the issue of the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony, again used forensically in a criminal case, was *United States v Miller*, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969). In *Miller*, the Second Circuit adopted the common law rule that hypnosis was a subject for impeachment. *Id.* at 832. In its opinion in this case, the Second Circuit made no mention of its prior holding in *Miller*.

The First Circuit in *Clay v Vose*, 771 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1022 (1986) held that the prior use of hypnosis on a witness goes to the weight to be given the testimony rather than its admissibility. Even in the criminal context, the First Circuit found no confrontation clause violation where the jury was permitted to assess the credibility of the previously hypnotized witness. *Id.* at 4. The Third Circuit, in *Chaussard v Fulcomer*, 816 F.2d 925 (3rd Cir.1987), *cert. denied* 484 U.S. 845 (1987), on review of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, found no error in the admission of testimony of a previously hypnotized rape victim, and held that the loss of notes and the police department's destruction of a tape recording of the session did not result in the denial of the prisoner's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation or due process rights.

The Sixth Circuit, in *Beck v Norris*, 801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986), (applying Tennessee law) properly treated the issue as one of competency and concluded the use of testimony of a previously hypnotized witness did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial, right of confrontation or effective assistance of counsel. The

Seventh Circuit in *Armstrong v Young*, 34 F.3d 421, 429 (7th Cir.1994), *cert. denied*, 115 S.Ct. 1369 (1995) declined to adhere to a specific set of court imposed guidelines, holding a defendant's due process and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by admission of a witness' posthypnosis identification testimony. *Id.* 428-430.

The view that hypnosis goes to the weight and credibility of the testimony, not its admissibility, was also followed in *State v. Brown*, 337 N.W. 2d 138 (N.D. 1983); *Chapman v State*, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982); and more recently in *State v Evans*, 450 S.E.2d 47 (S.C. 1994). In the therapeutic context, and on point, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that a witness hypnotized for relaxation purposes was competent to testify. *People v McKeenan*, 732 P.2d 1238 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986), *cert. denied* 753 P.2d 243 (1988).

The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, again in the forensic context, have adopted a case-by-case totality of the circumstances approach, but with less onerous standards than adopted by the court of appeals here. See, *White v Ieyoub*, 25 F.3d 245, 249 (5th Cir. 1994); *Armstrong v Young*, 34 F.3d 421, *cert. denied*, 115 S.Ct.1369 (1994); *McQueen v Garrison*, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 944 (1987); and *Sprynczynatyk v General Motors Corp.*, 771 F.2d 1112, 1123 n.14 (8th Cir. 1985) *cert. denied* 475 U.S. 1046 (1986)[5]. In *White*, *Armstrong* and *McQueen*, the testimony was allowed. In

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[5] The court of appeals claimed the Eight Circuit adopted the "totality-of-the circumstances" approach (App. 20A), however, the Eighth Circuit, itself, in *Boykin v. Leapley*, 28 F.3d 788, 793-794 (8th Cir. 1994), characterized the test as applying "safeguards". The "safeguard" and "totality" tests are frequently confused or mischaracterized. A "safeguard" approach would imply a mandatory set of standards, whereas a "totality" approach would imply balancing various factors on a complete record at or near the time of trial, with the failure to meet one or more factors not determinative of the issue. Here the court of appeals applied its test in a determinative "safeguard manner".

White, a case overlooked by the court of appeals[6], the Fifth Circuit found no constitutional violation in the admission of a witness' posthypnosis identification testimony after being hypnotized by a police hypnotist. *White v Ieyoub*, 25 F.3d 248, n.17. In *McQueen*, the testimony was allowed where the hypnosis was performed by an amateur hypnotist. In *Sprynczynatyk*, the Eighth Circuit remanded for purposes of an evidentiary hearing.

By comparison, the Petitioner's case represents an unusual instance of a federal appellate court upholding wholesale exclusion of a litigant's testimony without a trial or hearing. The court of appeals erroneously excluded the Petitioner's testimony applying its "totality of the circumstance test" in a safeguard manner:

1) The first factor involved an evaluation of the purpose of the hypnosis, whether investigative or therapeutic. This factor militated in favor of the admission of the Petitioner's testimony, the hypnosis was therapeutic.

2) The second factor considered whether there were any suggestions from the hypnotist or others prior to or during the hypnosis. This factor also militated in favor of admission of the Petitioner's testimony. App. 27A. A finding was made that the hypnotist did *not* add new element's to the Petitioner's memory. App. 9A.

3) The third factor involved the presence or absence of a permanent record, which can help the court ascertain whether suggestive procedures were used. The court stated that ideally the sessions should be videotaped or audiotaped. The court of appeals applied this factor in a determinative manner when in no way insures the reliability of the hypnotic procedure or the posthypnotic testimony. App. 27A.

4) The fourth factor considered whether the hypnotist was

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[6] The only Fifth Circuit opinion cited by the court of appeals was *United States v Valdez*, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit has since relaxed its strict view on hypnosis. See, *White v. Ieyoub*, 25 F.3d at 247.

appropriately qualified by training in psychology or psychiatry. The court of appeals erred in placing undue emphasis on "a general presumption in favor of appropriate academic credentials". App. 28A. The academic credentials of the hypnotist are not the key to minimizing suggestibility. Instead, the critical means of minimizing suggestibility, and thereby assuring reliability, is the use of nonleading questions in the manner performed by the hypnotist. The requirement that the hypnotist be appropriately qualified by "training in psychiatry or psychology" will bar the testimony of the many individuals hypnotized by licensed social workers, dentists, pain specialists, physical therapists, rehabilitation specialists, hypnotherapists, the clergy, those medical doctors not having "training in psychiatry or psychology", and other professionals, from using hypnosis as a therapeutic tool. Rather than considering the appropriate expert fit (ie. that the hypnotist was capable of performing the hypnosis and did not add new elements to the petitioner's memory), the court of appeals found academic credentials, rather than practical experience, to be determinative.

5) The fifth factor considered the existence of corroborating evidence. The petitioner did offer corroboration, including affidavits from three experts, one prehypnotic, that she exhibited the characteristic traits and symptoms of a victim of incest. In addition, the petitioner offered letters received from her sister, and predating the lawsuit by two years, stating the sister was sexual abused by the Respondents, an affidavit from a third victim stating that the affiant was sexually assaulted at the age of nine by the Respondent, Morrie Shay, and a card received by the Petitioner from her sister in December of 1994, stating: "Uncle Morrie and Aunt Chris did rape me when I was little also Joan, and I do not care if they disown me or hate me". App. 66A.

Although the petitioner offered corroboration, the court of appeals erred in making it a precondition to testifying. Corroboration is no more an indicia of reliability for the hypnotic procedure, than it is an indicia of reliability for purposes of determining the admissibility of hearsay statements in child sexual abuse cases. The precondition of corroboration was rejected in *Idaho v Wright*, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), where corroborative

evidence was "irrelevant to a showing of the 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' necessary for admission of hearsay statements under the confrontation clause". Corroboration is a question of proof of the underlying allegations to be ascertained at the time of trial. The absence of corroboration should not bar the testimony, nor should it prove the non-occurrence of the abuse. See, *supra*, 68 Temple L. Rev. 249, 278 (1995). "Otherwise, victims would have no remedy in cases where the abuse is non-violent or occurs in a private setting, making corroboration more difficult to obtain". *Id.*

6) The sixth factor involved consideration of evidence of the subject's hypnotizability. There are a number of scientific scales and tests developed for measuring hypnotizability, among them the Harvard Group Scale and the Stanford Hypnotic Suggestibility Scale. See, *supra*, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1185, 1238, n.227 (1994). The problem with this factor is that hypnotizability is a measure of an individual trait which has no bearing on the reliability of the hypnotic procedure. A trait of high hypnotizablity may result in barring otherwise reliable testimony. Moreover, to even apply the tests of hypnotizability a witness must be hypnotized, jeopardizing his or her legal right to testify in the process! Even if hypnotizability were relevant to the reliability of the hypnotic procedure, the court of appeals failed to remand for purposes of allowing the Petitioner to be tested.

7) The seventh factor involved consideration of expert evidence offered by the parties as to the reliability of the procedures used. Again, the court of appeals failed to remand for this purpose.

In addition, the court of appeals erroneously considered as one of its "nonexclusive" factors an assessment of the credibility of the petitioner's memories of sexual abuse. App. 29A-30A. The court of appeals held that "[o]ur conclusion is reinforced by the *inherent incredibility* of Borawick's allegations. In this case, Borawick has levelled fanciful accusations of sexual abuse against numerous persons other than the defendants in this matter that include persons familiar and unfamiliar to her". Incredibly, the court of appeals detailed in its published opinion information filed

under seal by the Respondents. Beyond question, the court of appeals evaluated the credibility of Petitioner's claims involving others outside of the case, concluding: [t]hat Borawick has made these *far-fetched*, uncorroborated accusations against others, in addition to the defendants, erodes our confidence in the allegations against Morrie and Christine Shay and *weighs* against the admissibility of her hypnotically-induced memories". *Id.*

It is the function of the jury alone, not an appellate court, to evaluate the credibility of a witness. 27 C. Wright & Gold, *Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence* §6005, at 39. This principle carries particular force in a case, such as this one, where the witness is the alleged victim and a party to the lawsuit. *Hoult v Hoult*, 57 F.3rd 1 (1st Cir. 1995). In the instant case, the court of appeals erroneously sanctioned a credibility assessment in a summary judgment context, on an incomplete appellate record with discovery left undone. When the validity of memory is contested, it is the role of the jury, not appellate courts, to assess credibility: "[a]fter direct and cross examination, after consideration of extrinsic evidence that tends to corroborate or contradict the memory, the focus must be on the credibility, the believability, the truth of the asserted memory". *Franklin v Duncan*, 884 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D.Cal. 1995). Not only is assessment of credibility a function of the jury, but a party should not be forced to try a case on an incomplete appellate record.

In making its credibility determination, the court of appeals erroneously concluded that transgenerational multiperpetrator and ritual child abuse is "fanciful" and "far-fetched". Yet the very type of conduct referred to in the court's opinion (App. 29A-30A) and the sealed portion of the record has received specific legislative recognition in California, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, and Montana, all states which have enacted legislation to deter ritual abuse crimes. See, App. 51A-61A. The Illinois statute, for example, defines ritual child abuse, among other things, as the forced ingestion of animal blood and includes the forced ingestion of narcotics or hallucinogens to induce a hypnotic state. See, Illinois Code §5/12-33, California Penal Code §667.83, Idaho Code §18-1506A, Louisiana Rev. Statute §14:107.1, and Montana Code §§27-2-217 and 45.5-627. App. 51A-61A.

Psychological manipulation, the misuse of hypnotic drugs and hypnosis are all conduct characteristic of ritual child abuse. Thus, it is all the more critical that post-hypnotic testimony be admissible to deter this type of criminal activity. If victims testimony is barred because of the inability to meet cumbersome, and in the ritualistic context impossible, tests of admissibility, the perpetrators will be immune from prosecution and liability.

Despite the court of appeal's incredulity, there are numerous reported examples of ritual crimes. Recently, in Prescott Ontario fifty-five adults in a multigenerational network were charged with the repeated violation of hundreds of individuals, 145 of whom were children and 80 who were adult. At least 16 of the accused were found guilty and 20 plead guilty. Kent, *Diabolic Debates: A Reply to David Frankfurter and J.S. La Fontaine*, Religion 24, 396 (1994). In November of 1994, the New York Times reported that a three month old boy was stabbed to death in a Quebec village during a ritual. See, *Quebec Boy Was Target of Cultists*, The New York Times, November 20, 1994, Sec. 1, p.19, col.1. This incident was proceeded by a mass murder ritual suicide of 53 members of a religious sect in Switzerland in October of 1994 and another 16 deaths in December of 1995 in eastern France linked to the Order of the Solar Temple, a cult which mixes elements of Christianity, astrology and the Order of the Knights of Templar. See, *Cult Horror Maims Prominent French Family*, The New York Times, December 27, 1995 at A9, col. 1.

Reported cases of cult and ritualistic activity can be found at *Commonwealth v Drew*, 489 NE2d 1233 (Mass. 1986); *State v Naylor*, 474 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 1991); *McCorkle v Johnson*, 881 F.2d 993 (11th Cir. 1989)(denying a prisoner the right to conduct rituals involving the drinking of blood); *Childs v Duckworth*, 705 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1983)(denying a prisoner the right to conduct rituals with candles and incense in his cell); *Howard v United States*, 864 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo. 1994) (upholding the right of a prisoner to perform religious rituals using candles, incense, a gong, a black robe, and a chalice); *Aquino v Stone*, 957 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1992) (Privacy Act appeal filed by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Aquino, founder of the Temple of Set, a satanist religion, after his discharge from the

U.S. Army Reserves following a criminal investigation into charges of child sexual abuse at the Child Development Center at the Presido), also see 18 A.L.R. 5th 804 (1995).

Significantly, *the Petitioner's memories concerning these nonparties were not uncovered in the hypnosis* but nevertheless were considered by the court in weighing against the admission of the Petitioner's posthypnotic testimony. The recollections pertaining to nonparties referred to at Appendix 29A-30A were not uncovered during the hypnosis[7]. The whole purpose of the Federal Rape Shield Statute, Fed. R. Evid. 412 (App. 48A), is to protect *victims* and *alleged victims* of sexual assault from any prejudice cast by being a victim of multiple assaults. The Petitioner was prejudiced by the court of appeal's complete incredulity of these unrelated events.

The court of appeals applied it's "totality of the circumstances" test in a determinative safeguard manner with its decision turning on four factors: 1) the hypnotist's qualifications; 2) the absence of a permanent record for the procedures used; 3) the court's perceived discomfort with the fact that the hypnotist may have read excerpts from the petitioner's deposition prior to testifying himself. (App. 29A); and 4) the court's disbelief in unrelated claims of mulitperpetrator abuse. The perceived weaknesses in the hypnotist's qualifications and the absence of a

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[7] The court of appeals made reference to an incident of sexual assault involving men who the Petitioner "believed to be members of the Masons" (App. 29A). Certainly, the fraternal affiliations of these individuals has little to do with whether the sexual assault took place. When a Catholic priest, Father James Porter, is capable of sexually abusing 68 people over a 34 year span (68 Temple L. Rev. 249, 251, n.17), it is equally plausible that pedophiles can infiltrate Masonic and other fraternal organizations as a cover for their criminal activities. Sex offenders are of all walks of life and individual members of fraternal organizations are not above criminal acts. For an example of a lawyer, and former Grand Master, found guilty by the Grand Lodge for misappropriation of funds and "un-Masonic conduct" under the Masonic Code of Trials see, ***Rutledge v Gulian***, 459 A.2d 680 (N.J. 1983). The court of appeals erred in assuming the events did not occur and weighing such assumption on review of a motion for summary judgment. Here, the Petitioner's father was a lawyer and judge, facing felony charges at the time of his death.

permanent record should, like all other factors, be areas of inquiry for cross-examination, not preconditions to the admissibility of the testimony. Experts are commonly called upon to review the procedures of others in the absence of videotapes, audiotapes, or verbatim records. Relying upon the absence of a permanent record as determinative, this factor seeks to evaluate the credibility of the hypnotist, as if his sworn deposition testimony is valueless.

In addition, the court record more accurately reflects that the hypnotist was not provided a copy of the petitioner's deposition, but rather a copy of the Petitioner's objection to the Respondent's motion in limine. This objection was filed in 1992, four years after the hypnosis sessions ended. It is inconceivable that the objection could in any way have tainted the hypnotic procedure. The court of appeals lost sight of the central issue, the reliability of the hypnotic procedure as established by the express findings of the district court that hypnosis was appropriate for the memory loss involved and the hypnotist added no new elements to the Petitioner's memories.

The issue in this case is of compelling importance to the petitioner and the public, presenting itself as a timely opportunity to decide an issue left undecided in *Rock,* and to resolve a conflict among the Circuits in light of *Rock* and *Daubert*. The need for guidance by this court is critical for the many professionals who use hypnosis, for victims of child sexual abuse and other violent crimes who can lapse into self-hypnotic states, and for *any civil litigant* who has undergone any form of therapeutic hypnosis and later wishes to testify in court. If the decision of the Second Circuit is allowed to stand, those who commit child sexual abuse and ritual abuse crimes will take solace in the fact that heinous abuse will be disbelieved, that victim's testimony will be completely excluded, and that there will never be a trial on the merits. If such claims are discredited without a trial or hearing and testimony is excluded "some of the most pathological abusers may be protected, ironically, by virtue of the egregious harm they inflict". 109 *Harv. L. Rev.* at 606. This is a dangerous precedent.

II. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED TO RESOLVE IMPORTANT FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The court of appeals erred in concluding that Petitioner's Due Process and Seventh Amendment claims were without merit. App. 32A. The methodology used by the court of appeals to exclude the Petitioner's testimony violates the Fifth Amendment right to procedural and substantive due process, and her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. This being a civil case, the Respondents cannot invoke the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause so frequently relied upon in many state court precedents involving forensic hypnosis in criminal cases.

The Fifth Amendment provides: "No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." The Petitioner's testimony was excluded on an incomplete record without the Respondents ever offering expert testimony supporting their motion *in limine*, without the Petitioner being permitted to depose individuals other than her hypnotist once the motion *in limine* was filed, without an evidentiary hearing, and without the rape shield protection afforded by Fed. R. Evid. 412. Worse yet, the court engaged in a credibility assessment.

The Petitioner has a liberty interest in not being sexually violated[8]. Indeed this Court has on many occasions recognized the fundamental due process liberty interests of an individual to bodily integrity and personal autonomy. *Cruzan v Director, MDH*, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); *Roe v Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Petitioner also has a liberty interest in undergoing an approved treatment modality at the recommendation of her medical doctor and recognized by the American Medical Association since 1958. This court has recognized a liberty interest under the due process clause in the right to refuse medical treatment and a liberty interest in the right to seek a treatment of choice. See, *Cruzan, supra* 278; *Mills v Rogers*, 457 U.S. 291, 298 (1982). When liberty interests are at stake, due process is implicated. *Matthews v Eldridge*, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).

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[8] Congress recently gave legislative recognition to the right to be free from gender based crimes of violence by enacting 42 U.S.C. §13981(b). App. 50A.

The court of appeals also erred in violating the Petitioner's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. None of the state or federal criminal precedents involve a civil litigant's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The Seventh Amendment reads: "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law". The Seventh Amendment has also long been recognized as a fundamental guaranty of the rights and *liberties* of the people. *Hodges v Easton*, 106 U.S. 408 (1882); *Woodell v IBEW*, 502 U.S. 93 (1991). The Constitution itself commits the trial of facts in a civil cause in the federal system to the jury. *Edmonson v Leesville Concrete Co.* 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). Here, the Petitioner was forced to try her case before the court of appeals.

The court of appeals erred in assessing the Petitioner's credibility, and encroached upon the province of the jury. The court of appeals stated: "[t]hat Borawick has made these far-fetched, uncorroborated accusations against others, in addition to the defendants, erodes our confidence in the allegations against Morrie and Christine Shay and properly *weighs* against the admissibility of her (assumed by the court to be) hypnotically-induced memories" App. 30A. To permit appellate court judges to exclude evidence on the basis of credibility violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. 27 C. Wright & Gold, *Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence* §6005, at 46. Summary judgment should not preempt the Petitioner's right to a jury trial where a question of material fact exists - whether the Respondents sexually assaulted her.

When Congress delegated rule making authority to this Court it declared that, "such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and shall preserve the right of trial by jury at common law and as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution". 28 U.S.C.§2072. See also, *Beacon Theaters v Westover*, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that "every person is competent to be a witness". Fed. R. Evid. 601. Rule 601 eliminates all grounds for witness

disqualification except for those described in Article Six of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 601 converts all other competency issues into questions of witness credibility for the jury. There is nothing contained in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and specifically Article Six, or the constitution, which supports the result reached by the court of appeals or which would require the adoption of a special test of admissibility for Petitioner's testimony. In enacting C.G.S. §54-86h, the Connecticut legislature has deemed child victims of sexual abuse competent to testify: "No witness shall be automatically adjudged incompetent to testify because of age and any child who is a victim of assault, sexual assault or abuse shall be competent to testify without prior qualification. The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witness shall be for the determination of the trier of fact". C.G.S.§54-86h, *supra*, p.4. Clearly, there exists a strong public policy in permitting victims of sexual abuse to testify so that cases may be tried on their merits.

The court of appeals erroneously confused a competency determination with an evaluation of credibility usurping the role of the jury, and violating the Petitioner's due process and Seventh Amendment rights in the process. Critical federal constitutional questions are involved, meriting the granting of this petition.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit should be granted.

THE PETITIONER,

BY

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(203) 740-0074

No. _____

In The

Supreme Court Of The United States

October Term, 1995

JOAN S. BORAWICK,

Petitioner

v.

MORRIE SHAY AND CHRISTINE SHAY,

Respondents

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

APPENDICES

TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDICES

Opinion of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Filed October 17, 1995 . . . . . 1A-32A

Judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Filed October 17, 1995 . . . . . 33A-34A

Denial of Petition for Rehearing
Filed December 29, 1995 . . . . . 35A

Ruling of the United States
District Court for the District of
Connecticut on Defendants' Motion
For Judgment On The Pleadings 36A-44A

Ruling of the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut on Defendants'
Motion For Summary Judgment 45A-46A

Judgment of the United States
District Court for the District
of Connecticut Dated May 10, 1994 . . . . . 47A

Federal Rules of Evidence 412 . . . . . 48A-49A

42 U.S.C §13981 . . . . . 49A-50A

California Penal Code §667.83 . . . . . 51A-52A

Idaho Code §18-1506A 53A-54A

Illinois Revised Statute §5/12-33 . . . . . 55A-56A

Louisiana Revised Statutes §14:107.1 . . . . . 57A-58A

Montana Code Ann. §27-2-217 . . . . . 59A

Montana Code Ann. §45-5-627 . . . . . 60A-61A

Affidavit 62A-65A

Card dated December 24, 1994 . . . . . 66A

Lawyer Charged With Negligent Homicide In Sumner Girl's Death, Enumclaw Courier-Herald, August 9, 1973 . . . . . 67A-68A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

No. 690—August Term 1994

(Argued December 19, 1994 Decided October 17, 1995)

Docket No. 94-7584

JOAN S. BORAWICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

—v.—

MORRIE SHAY and CHRISTINE SHAY,

Defendants-Appellees.

Before:

VAN GRAAFEILAND, WALKER, and CABRANES,

Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-appellant appeals from a final judgment entered on May 10, 1994 by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, (T.F. Gilroy Daly, *J.*), granting the defendants' motion for summary judg-

ment, following an in limine ruling prohibiting the plaintiff from testifying based on hypnotically-refreshed recollections of sexual abuse.

Affirmed.

HELEN L. MCGONIGLE, Brookfield, CT, *for Plaintiff-Appellant.*

CHARLES W. FLEISCHMANN, Bridgeport, CT (GULASH & FLEISCHMANN, Bridgeport, CT), *for Defendants-Appellees.*

WALKER, *Circuit Judge*:

This case presents an issue of first impression: the circumstances under which an alleged victim of sexual abuse may testify as to memories of abuse following therapeutic hypnosis. Plaintiff-appellant, Joan S. Borawick, appeals from a final judgment entered on May 10, 1994 by the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (T.F. Gilroy Daly, *District Judge*), adopting the recommendations of Magistrate Judge Joan G. Margolis and entering summary judgment in favor of defendants, Morrie and Christine Shay, whom Borawick accused of sexually abusing her as a child. This judgment for defendants followed an in limine ruling prohibiting the plaintiff from testifying based on hypnotically-refreshed recollections of sexual abuse. *Borawick v. Shay*, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 (D. Conn. 1994).

BACKGROUND

Borawick, who is currently thirty-eight years old and a citizen of California, brought a diversity tort action alleging that her aunt and uncle, Christine and Morrie Shay, Connecticut citizens, sexually abused her in the summers of 1961 and 1964, when she visited them at their home at the ages of four and seven, respectively. At the time, she lived in Seattle. Borawick had no memory of the alleged abuse for more than twenty years.

During the fall of 1984, Borawick began to experience panic attacks. When they continued, in the winter of 1985, she sought and received treatment on five or six occasions with a psychiatrist, Dr. Irwin Ruben. From April, 1986 through July, 1987, Dr. Anthony Reading, a clinical psychologist, continued the treatment. In the spring of 1987, she also sought medical treatment for chronic physical illness with Dr. Ronald Peters, a medical doctor and part owner of the Pacific Medical Center ("PMC") in Santa Monica, California. PMC's clientele was largely composed of people from the entertainment industry.

After reviewing Borawick's medical history of chronic illness, Dr. Peters referred Borawick to Valerian St. Regis, a hypnotist who worked under Peters's supervision, since "problems in childhood" sometimes cause chronic illness and are susceptible to recall through hypnosis. Borawick underwent twelve to fourteen hypnotic sessions with St. Regis from the summer of 1987 through the fall of 1988. Before and immediately following these sessions, she had no recollection of abuse, much less of any abuse by these defendants.

When deposed in 1993, St. Regis testified that he had no permanent records relating to the hypnosis of Borawick; however, prior to his deposition, he had read a portion of Borawick's deposition. St. Regis maintained that, before hypnotizing Borawick, he had no expectation of the type of information that the hypnosis would reveal. He explained that he used "regression therapy" to take Borawick back to the age of between three and five years old. St. Regis also testified that, in general, instead of using hypnotic suggestion with Borawick, he asked broad questions such as "what happened?," "what do you remember?," or "what do you recall?."

St. Regis testified that Borawick revealed under hypnosis that her aunt, defendant Christine Shay, persuaded Borawick, at age four, to strip and engage in "ritual dancing." St. Regis further stated that during hypnosis Borawick described anal object penetration by Christine Shay, as well as another incident in which her aunt inserted a "cap pistol in [Borawick's] vagina." St. Regis also testified that during hypnotic sessions, Borawick disclosed that her uncle, defendant Morrie Shay, anally raped her. St. Regis did not know whether the alleged anal rape involved penile insertion or object insertion.

St. Regis testified that he did not reveal to Borawick what she had described during the sessions, because, in his opinion, such revelations would have been "devastating" and would probably surface in time. Borawick attended her last session with St. Regis in the fall of 1988.

Borawick testified in her deposition that during the second week of February, 1989, several months after her final hypnotic session, she experienced her first non-hypnotic memory of sexual abuse by her father, who is

not a defendant in this case. Following this initial recollection, according to Borawick, subsequent memories surfaced in "bits and pieces." Her first memory concerning defendant Christine Shay allegedly occurred on February 10, 1989. On that date, Borawick first recalled her aunt vaginally raping her with a pistol. In late 1990 or early 1991, she first remembered an incident when Christine Shay forced "a broomstick into [Borawick's] vagina." Borawick also stated that she regained memory of being naked in the presence of her aunt and "having to dance around."

Borawick testified that her memory of being anally raped by defendant Morrie Shay surfaced in 1990. In addition to recalling sexual abuse by her father, aunt, and uncle, Borawick also claims sexual abuse by numerous others, including family members and her father's friends. More detailed references to these individuals and their various "rituals" and other alleged abusive conduct are described in the sealed portion of the appendix.

On January 24, 1992, Borawick commenced this action, seeking compensatory and punitive damages from Morrie Shay and Christine Shay for their alleged willful, wanton, and malicious sexual exploitation of her in 1961 and 1964. *Borawick*, 842 F. Supp. at 1501. Judge Daly denied plaintiff's motion to enlarge time for discovery on July 23, 1992. On November 4, 1992, defendants filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the plaintiff's testimony. The in limine motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Joan Glazer Margolis. Borawick's second motion to enlarge time for discovery, filed on February 10, 1993, was not ruled upon.

After an initial ruling on March 24, 1993 that set forth the test the magistrate judge would follow in deciding

the in limine motion and after receiving further written submissions, the magistrate judge issued a supplemental ruling on May 26, 1993. The ruling recommended granting the defendants' motion in limine to exclude Borawick's testimony, principally on the ground that St. Regis was "not appropriately qualified." *Borawick*, 842 F. Supp. at 1508.

While Borawick's objections to the magistrate judge's initial and supplemental ruling were pending before the district judge, the United States Supreme Court decided *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993). Accordingly, the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the in limine rulings on the ground that the therapeutic use of hypnosis and her resultant testimony satisfied *Daubert*. Borawick submitted as additional evidence copies of two letters purportedly received from her younger sister in 1989. Both referenced sexual assault against the sister, and one expressly identified the defendants as the perpetrators. Borawick also submitted two expert affidavits, one from a board-certified psychiatrist, Matthew Klein, M.D., and one from a clinical and forensic psychologist, Anne Pratt, M.D., as further support that the therapeutic use of hypnosis is widely accepted in the mental health community and is used for treatment of victims of sexual abuse. The defendants filed a reply and objection to plaintiff's objections, including a letter dated August 1, 1992, also allegedly written by the younger sister, that recanted her earlier allegations. Upon reconsideration, the magistrate judge adhered to her earlier recommended ruling. *Borawick*, 842 F. Supp. at 1509. On January 10, 1994, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation. *Id.* at 1501.

Shortly thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment. After the magistrate judge issued a recommended ruling granting the defendants' motion, the plaintiff refiled and the district court retained and denied a motion by Borawick dated February 10, 1993 to reopen discovery and to enlarge the time for taking depositions. On May 10, 1994, final judgment was entered in favor of the defendants. Borawick appeals from this judgment.[1]

DISCUSSION

Borawick raises the following claims on appeal: 1) the district court erred in granting the in limine motion because it applied the incorrect legal rule regarding the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony; 2) the district court's ruling was inconsistent with the holding in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993); 3) the district court violated Borawick's right to a jury trial in granting the in limine motion, which resulted in a summary judgment in favor of the defendants; 4) the district court deprived her of due process in its rulings on Borawick's numerous motions.

I. Admissibility of Post-Hypnotic Testimony

This circuit has yet to address the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony of memories elicited as a result of hypnosis. While numerous state and federal courts have considered this issue, nearly all of them dealt with recall in the context of hypnosis that was specifically intended to enhance a memory of a particular known or suspected occurrence. The parties have not cited, nor are

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[1] The Record on Appeal includes both an original record from the district court after oral argument and a supplemental record submitted pursuant to a stipulation approved by the district judge.

we aware of, any case concerning the specific issue before us: the admissibility of testimony about memories of childhood sexual abuse that are recalled for the first time in adulthood following the use of hypnosis as part of psychotherapy.

A. *District Court's Approach*

Judge Daly and Magistrate Judge Margolis were highly sensitive to the various concerns surrounding post-hypnotic testimony. The district court recognized that, although most of the caselaw concerns situations in which hypnosis was used to refresh a victim's or witness's memory of a crime or accident, the hypnosis in this case was used for therapeutic as opposed to investigative purposes. *Borawick*, 842 F. Supp. at 1503-05. Giving credence to Borawick's claim that her "psychological injuries caused by childhood sexual abuse are different than for victims of other torts, and that victims of sexual abuse may repress conscious memories of the abuse for years," the district court concluded that hypnosis is appropriate for the type of repression and loss of memory Borawick allegedly experienced. *Id.* at 1505.

Before testimony induced by hypnosis would be admissible, however, the district court determined that certain safeguards were necessary "not only to bolster a plaintiff's legitimate claims for childhood sexual abuse, but also to protect a defendant against devastating charges." *Id.* These safeguards were that 1) the hypnotist be appropriately qualified, 2) the hypnotist "avoid adding new elements to the subject's description," 3) "a permanent record be available to ensure against suggestive procedures," and 4) there be "other evidence to corroborate the hypnotically enhanced testimony." *Id.* The linchpin of the district court's ultimate decision to

exclude Borawick's testimony was its finding as to the first safeguard: that St. Regis was not qualified.[2] *Id.* at 1509 & n.5. The district court did not address the third element, but noted that St. Regis was not able to produce the reports that he claimed to have prepared contemporaneously. *Id.* at 1507. The district court suggested, however, that the second safeguard was met in that there was "no indication that St. Regis added new elements to plaintiff's descriptions while under hypnosis." *Id.* at 1508. Given these findings, particularly St. Regis's lack of qualifications, the district court saw no need to decide whether the corroborating evidence Borawick offered satisfied the fourth safeguard. *Id.* at 1508 n.5. With two of the four safeguards not met, the district court granted the in limine motion to exclude Borawick's testimony of sexual abuse.

B. *Borawick's Claims*

Borawick first contends that the district court erred in characterizing her recall of sexual abuse as hypnotically refreshed. Rather, she asserts, these memories may have "unfolded on their own" even without therapeutic hypnosis. Based on the timing and nature of the recollections, however, we discern no basis for disturbing the district court's finding that the memories were in fact refreshed by hypnosis.

The gravamen of Borawick's appeal is that even if her testimony were to be construed as post-hypnotic, the district court erred in adopting its legal test in requiring

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[2] The court initially found the record devoid of any information regarding St. Regis's qualifications and any safeguards he may have used in conducting the hypnosis of Borawick. Borawick was given the opportunity to supplement the record by deposing St. Regis and to offer any corroborating evidence. *Id.* at 1505.

both independent corroborating evidence and a permanent record of the hypnosis. She also argues that the district court clearly erred in concluding that St. Regis was not qualified as a hypnotist. Instead, Borawick argues, she should be deemed competent to testify under Federal Rule of Evidence 601, which reflects a strong presumption in favor of witness competency, and that this circuit should adopt a rule of per se admissibility of testimony related to memories following the use of hypnosis for therapeutic purposes.

C. *Standard of Review*

Before turning to the merits of this case, we address the appropriate standard of review. Borawick argues that because the exclusionary rule resulted in her inability to oppose the summary judgment motion, which led to her ultimate defeat on the summary judgment motion, we should review the challenge de novo. The Shays contend that because this is an evidentiary issue, the district court had broad discretion and we should therefore review its decision for abuse of discretion.

Our review must be de novo on the question whether, in exercising its discretion to admit evidence, the district court applied the proper legal test. *See A/S Dampskibsselskabet Torm v. Beaumont Oil Ltd.*, 927 F.2d 713, 716 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 502 U.S. 862 (1991). We review the district court's finding that St. Regis was unqualified for clear error. *Id.*

D. *What is Hypnosis?*

While "[t]here is no single, generally accepted theory of hypnosis, [or] consensus about a single definition," Council on Scientific Affairs, "Scientific Status of

Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis," 253 JAMA 1918, 1919 (1985) [hereinafter, Scientific Affairs], " 'there is considerable consensus at the descriptive level' as to how the [phenomenon] manifests itself in the hypnotized individual," 27 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 6011, at 116 (1990) [hereinafter Federal Practice] (quoting Orne, "On the Simulating Subject as a Quasi-Control Group in Hypnosis Research, What Why and How," in Hypnosis: Developments in Research and New Perspectives 519-21 (E. Fromm & R.E. Shor eds., 2d ed. 1979)). The American Medical Association has described hypnosis as a

> temporary condition of altered attention in the subject which may be induced by another person and in which a variety of phenomena may appear spontaneously or in response to [verbal] or other stimuli. These phenomena include alterations in consciousness and memory, increased susceptibility to suggestion, and the production in the subject of responses and ideas unfamiliar to him in his usual state of mind.

People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 515-16 (Ill. 1989) (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).

As early as 1958, the American Medical Association recognized hypnosis as a valid therapeutic technique. Council on Medical Health of the American Medical Association, "Medical Uses of Hypnosis," 168 JAMA 186, 187 (1958). It has been found useful in psychotherapy, in the treatment of psychosomatic illness, to alleviate pain or as a substitute for anesthesia, and for memory recall. *See People v. Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 533; 466 N.Y.S.2d 255, 259 (1983); Jacqueline

Kanovitz, "Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials," 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1185, 1210 n.101 (1992). Hypnosis has been credited with restoring lost memories that include repressed memories of painful experiences. Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 117; *see also* Kanovitz, *supra*, at 1225 & n.168 (1992). It has sometimes been useful in developing leads in criminal investigations. *See Harker v. Maryland*, 800 F.2d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that "Dr. Martin Orne, a psychiatrist and frequent expert witness, believes that 'hypnosis may be useful in some instances to help bring back forgotten memories following an accident or a crime.' " (quoting Orne, "The Use and Misuse of Hypnosis in Court," 27 Int. J. Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis 311, 317-18 (1979))); *see Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 533; 466 N.Y.S.2d at 259; Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 118-19. Despite these successes, many in the field remain skeptical of the reliability of hypnosis as a technique for refreshing or restoring memory. *Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 533; 466 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (noting it provides "at best mixed results" in criminal investigations). Empirical studies calling into question the ability of hypnosis to restore memory effectively have engendered "considerable controversy" concerning the validity of using hypnosis for that purpose. Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1918. Thus, "[t]he popular belief that hypnosis guarantees the accuracy of recall is as yet without established foundation," *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44, 59 (1987), and no consensus has been reached regarding the ability of hypnosis to enhance memory, Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1918.

The controversy over the effectiveness of hypnosis in memory enhancement centers in large part on disagreements concerning theories of memory. Those scientists

who are most optimistic about the role of hypnosis in memory recall conceptualize a process whereby the brain records and stores sensory input accurately, much like a videotape. Recall is the ability to "play back" that tape, and loss of memory is the inability to retrieve that information. *See Little v. Armontrout*, 819 F.2d 1425, 1429 (8th Cir.), *aff'd*, 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988); *Harker*, 800 F.2d at 439; *United States v. Valdez*, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984); Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1920. Under this theory, hypnosis simply enhances the retrieval process.

Many scientists reject this theory, however. They view memory recall as "much more complex and much less accurate than previously thought." *State v. Tuttle*, 780 P.2d 1203, 1210 (Utah 1989), *cert. denied*, 494 U.S. 1018 (1990); *see* Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1920. Instead, they espouse a "construction theory" of memory, which holds that a memory is formed and influenced by numerous factors when the mind creates and integrates the information from an event "into the memory representation of that event." *Valdez*, 722 F.2d at 1200. The composite created by this process is malleable and evolves over time as additional input is received. In fact, a leading proponent of this theory has written that memory is " 'being continually remade [and] reconstructed in the interest of the present.' " F. Bartlett, Remembering 213 (reprint 1964) (1932), *quoted in Little*, 819 F.2d at 1429.

The "constructivists" are highly skeptical of any view that hypnosis can effectively and accurately enhance memory. They believe that because hypnosis has the power to contribute to memory reconstruction, it can create inaccurate memories. In other words, if present

events can contribute to a construction of a memory that differs from that which was originally perceived and if the process of hypnosis is such an event, then hypnosis may distort memory.

The courts have identified several problems with the reliability of hypnotically-refreshed recall. First, a person undergoing hypnosis becomes more susceptible to suggestion. The subject may be influenced by verbal and nonverbal cues, intentionally or unintentionally planted by the hypnotist. This suggestibility may be enhanced by the perception that hypnosis will refresh one's memory and by a wish to please the hypnotist. *See Rock*, 483 U.S. at 59-60; *Little*, 819 F.2d at 1429; *Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 534-35, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 260; *State v. Hurd*, 432 A.2d 86, 93 (N.J. 1981).

In addition, a hypnotized person may "confabulate," that is, fill in the gaps in her memory to make it comprehensible. The added details may be derived from irrelevant or unrelated facts or from pure fantasy. *See Rock*, 483 U.S. at 60; *Little*, 819 F.2d at 1429-30. Like suggestibility, confabulation can occur as a result of the subject's desire to please the hypnotist by coming up with complete and coherent memories. *See Harker*, 800 F.2d at 440; *Pearson v. State*, 441 N.E.2d 468, 471 (Ind. 1982) (citing Levitt, "The Use of Hypnosis to 'Freshen' the Memory of Witnesses or Victims," *Trial*, April 1981, at 56); *Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 535, N.Y.S.2d at 260.

A third problem with hypnotically-refreshed recall is "memory hardening," a phenomenon which gives the subject enhanced confidence in the facts remembered, whether they be true or false. *See Rock*, 483 U.S. at 60; *Harker*, 800 F.2d at 440; *Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 535, N.Y.S.2d at 260 (describing experiments that demon-

strate this phenomenon). Even as inaccurate recollections increase, the subject's confidence is likely to remain constant or even to increase. In 1985 a leading scientific journal reported that no studies have shown "an increase in accuracy associated with an appropriate increase in confidence in the veracity of recollections." Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1921. The lack of correlation between the accuracy of recall and the subject's confidence in the accuracy makes it more difficult for a jury or even an expert to judge the credibility of hypnotically-enhanced testimony, *see Hurd*, 432 A.2d at 93-94, and makes cross-examination difficult, *Rock*, 483 U.S. at 60.

Finally, after undergoing hypnosis to refresh memory, individuals may lose the ability to assess their memory critically and be more prone to speculation than if they had relied only on normal memory recall. *Little*, 819 F.2d at 1430-31. The subject becomes less able "to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate recollections." Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1921. He or she may also experience "source amnesia," believing that a statement heard prior to hypnosis was a product of his or her own memory. *Little*, 819 F.2d at 1430.

As a result of the foregoing phenomena, the "hypnotically recalled memory is apt to be a mosaic of (1) appropriate actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fantasy, and (4) fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole." Bernard L. Diamond, "Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness," 68 Cal. L. Rev. 313, 335 (1980); *see* Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1921. In the worst case, someone who has undergone hypnosis might "inaccurately reconstruct the memory . . . and . . . then become convinced of the absolute accuracy of the recon-

struction through memory hardening." *Harker*, 800 F.2d at 441. The "constructionist" views, supported as they are in the scientific community, have considerable force. In our view, they cannot easily be discounted when the integrity of the judicial factfinding process is at stake, particularly when no study has shown that hypnosis used to refresh memory increases only accurate recall. Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1921.

E. *Various Approaches to the Admissibility Question*

The state and federal courts that have been faced with the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony have followed four different approaches. Some courts treat all such testimony as per se admissible under the theory that hypnosis does not render the witness incompetent, but goes to the question of credibility. *See, e.g.*, *Kline v. Ford Motor Co.*, 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975) ("That [a witness's] present memory depends upon refreshment claimed to have been induced under hypnosis goes to the credibility of her testimony not to her competence as a witness."); *United States v. Waksal*, 539 F. Supp. 834, 838 (S.D. Fla. 1982), *rev'd on other grounds*, 709 F.2d 653 (11th Cir. 1983); *Pearson*, 441 N.E.2d at 473; Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 123-24. This position depends in considerable part on one's faith in the jury's ability to evaluate the testimony accurately in light of cross-examination, expert testimony relating to hypnosis, and jury instructions. Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 124. Such an approach was particularly favored when courts were just beginning to address the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony, *see Tuttle*, 780 P.2d at 1208, but it "has sparsely been followed since 1980," *Zayas*, 546 N.E.2d at 516.

Courts at the other end of the spectrum have found that post-hypnotic testimony is per se inadmissible because the witness is incompetent to testify regarding such matters. *See, e.g., Zayas*, 546 N.E.2d at 518; *Tuttle*, 780 P.2d at 1211; *People v. Shirley*, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384 (Cal.), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 860 (1982). The common thread running through these cases is that the possible distorting effects of hypnosis on memory are impossible to circumvent and are so substantial that "the game is not worth the candle." *Shirley*, 723 P.2d at 1366. Worse yet, "hypnotism aggravates the unreliability of normal memory." *Valdez*, 722 F.2d at 1200 (referring to finding of California Supreme Court). Reasoning that no safeguard can adequately ensure reliability, these courts deem the evidence inadmissible.[3] *See Shirley*, at 641 P.2d at 1384. A number of courts apply a modified version of the rule by confirming the witness's testimony to matters recalled before undergoing hypnosis. *See, e.g., Tuttle*, 780 P.2d at 1211; *Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 545; 466 N.Y.S.2d at 266.

In *Rock v. Arkansas*, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), the Supreme Court reviewed Arkansas's rule that a criminal defendant's hypnotically-refreshed testimony was per se inadmissible. While the Court recognized the problems with hypnosis, it concluded that certain procedural safeguards could reduce the potential inaccuracies of post-hypnotic

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[3] Many courts have taken this position on the basis that the testimony does not meet the requirements of *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), since there is no general acceptance in the scientific community that hypnosis can reliably enhance memory. *See Tuttle*, 780 P.2d at 1209-10; *Hughes*, 59 N.Y.2d at 543, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265; Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 132-33. This rationale is now called into question with the Supreme Court's decision in *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793 (1993), holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence supersede *Frye*. *See* Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 8 (Supp. 1995).

testimony. *Id.* at 59-60. Focusing on the due process right of criminal defendants to testify in their own defense, *id.* at 51, the Sixth Amendment right to call witnesses in the defendant's favor, *id.* at 52, and the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compelled testimony, *id.* at 52-53, the Court concluded that the rule of per se inadmissibility was an "arbitrary restriction on the [criminal defendant's] right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the State repudiating the validity of all posthypnosis recollections," *id.* at 61. Consequently, the Court deemed Arkansas's prohibition unconstitutional. The Court, however, explicitly limited the reach of its holding by refusing to express an opinion as to the appropriate rule of admissibility "of testimony of previously hypnotized witnesses other than criminal defendants." *Id.* at 58 n. 15.

The third and fourth approaches occupy a middle ground. These attempt to balance the competing concerns that animate the per se positions. The third approach, articulated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the oft-cited *State v. Hurd*, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981), requires adherence to a list of prescribed safeguards intended to ensure the reliability of hypnotically-refreshed testimony. The court concluded that "a rule of per se inadmissibility is unnecessarily broad and will result in the exclusion of evidence that is as trustworthy as other eyewitness testimony." *Id.* at 94.

In light of recommendations offered by a frequent expert witness, Dr. Martin Orne, the court adopted the following procedural requirements:

> First, a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis must conduct the session. This professional should also be able to qualify as

an expert in order to aid the court in evaluating the procedures followed. . . .

Second, the professional conducting the hypnotic session should be independent of and not regularly employed by the prosecutor, investigator or defense. . . .

Third, any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel or the defense prior to the hypnotic session must be recorded, either in writing or another suitable form. . . .

Fourth, before inducing hypnosis the hypnotist should obtain from the subject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them [without] . . . asking structured questions or adding new details.

Fifth, all contacts between the hypnotist and the subject must be recorded. . . .

Sixth, only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and the post-hypnotic interview.

Id. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).

The presence of these safeguards, however, was not sufficient in *Hurd* for the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony. The trial court was also directed to assess the reliability and the admissibility of the testimony in light of the following non-exclusive list of considerations, *id.* at 96: "the kind of memory loss that hypnosis was used to restore and the specific technique employed," *id.* at 95, whether the memory loss in question is "likely to yield normal recall if hypnosis is properly administered," and "whether the witness has any discernible

motivation for not remembering or for 'recalling' a particular version of the events," *id.* at 96. Finally, the court held that the party attempting to admit the hypnotically-enhanced testimony bears the burden of demonstrating that the testimony is reliable based on the standards described. *Id.* at 97.

Several courts have followed the *Hurd* guidelines or adopted similar ones. *See State v. Weston*, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ohio App. 1984); *House v. State*, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-27 (Miss. 1984); *see also* Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 168.

Finally, the approach most frequently taken by the federal courts, Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 173, is a so-called case-by-case or totality-of-the-circumstances approach, *see, e.g.*, *McQueen v. Garrison*, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 944 (1987); *Wicker v. McCotter*, 783 F.2d 487, 492-93 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); *Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.*, 771 F.2d 1112, 1123 (8th Cir. 1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986). While recognizing the benefits of the *Hurd* guidelines, these courts conclude that the district court should be given discretion to balance all of the factors to determine the reliability of the evidence and the probative versus prejudicial effect of the testimony. They note that even though the safeguards required by other courts

> represent[ ] the type of general reliability inquiry that must be made[,] . . . a court cannot necessarily rest solely on the reliability *vel non* of the hypnosis procedures in ruling on the admissibility of the proffered testimony. Even though all of the *Hurd* safeguards might be employed, the defendant may still be able to demonstrate by expert testimony that a witness' memory has been irreparably distorted by

> hypnosis. On the other hand, even if the hypnosis procedures are flawed, a trial or appellate court might discern that a witness' testimony was nonetheless independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis.

McQueen, 814 F.2d at 958 (citations omitted). As the foregoing summary indicates, the law continues to be in a state of flux regarding the reception of hypnotically-enhanced testimony. *See* Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 123.

F. *Hypnosis as a Therapeutic Tool*

The existing caselaw concerning the admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony, while helpful to our analysis, is grounded in fact situations where the hypnosis is specifically directed to the witness's recollections of known events, rather than where repressed memories of past traumas previously unknown simply emerge following hypnosis. Borawick, relying heavily on a law review article, Kanovitz, *supra*, at 1213, argues that hypnosis functions differently and more reliably when it results in the retrieval of repressed memories of traumatic events than when it is used to refresh one's memory of eye-witnessed events and therefore testimony relating to the former should be admitted on a per se basis.

The research on hypnosis only uses subjects with normal memory function who are exposed to simulations of real-life events to "replicate eyewitness situations," *id.* at 1212, 1223, since for practical and ethical reasons, it is impossible to design effective controlled studies to test the ability of hypnosis to retrieve accurate, suppressed memories of childhood trauma, *id.* at 1221-22.

The Kanovitz article sets forth some arguments in support of the view that hypnosis may be better able to retrieve memories "kept out of conscious awareness by ego-defenses that protect the psyche from trauma," *id.* at 1194, than hypnosis used for normal memory recall. In the clinical setting, hypnosis may overcome the psychological barriers to remembering past traumas because it induces profound relaxation and calmness, intensifies concentration, and focuses the subject's attention inward. *Id.* at 1213. In addition, the clinical literature "abounds with case histories of spectacular memory successes." *Id.* at 1225. Finally, repressed memories of events that have a traumatic impact upon the witness may, even if unconscious, tend to remain fixed and survive longer than memories of events witnessed quickly, in the context of a great deal of other sensory information. *Id.* at 1231-32.

Based on those reasons, the article concludes that courts should be more willing to accept testimony based on retrieval of repressed memories than when hypnosis is used to enhance eyewitness accounts, particularly since failure to admit post-hypnotic testimony in cases like this one might discourage the use of hypnosis in therapy. Therapists might fear that patients who discover they were victimized as children could lose the opportunity for legal redress if their testimony was based on post-hypnotic recall. *See id.* at 1255-56. Noting, however, that clinical hypnosis is not without some risk of memory distortion—for example, clinicians may "overstep[ ] the boundaries of interviewing neutrality" and may be especially interested in their patients' "subjective impressions" of their pasts, rather than accurate recollections, *id.* at 1218—the Kanovitz article suggests that courts should ask "whether hypnosis can create sex-

ual abuse memories in subjects who have never experienced abuse." *Id.* at 1220. Because the "only evidence that hypnosis can implant false autobiographical memories comes from experiments with subjects who are hand-picked for their high hypnotizability," *id.* at 1235, a characteristic that can be measured, *id.* at 1238, the article suggests that "high hypnotizability [may be] a factor bearing on admissibility." *Id.* at 1239.

While we appreciate the force of many of these arguments, the fact remains that the literature has not yet conclusively demonstrated that hypnosis is a consistently effective means to retrieve repressed memories of traumatic, past experiences accurately. For example, the Council on Scientific Affairs has pointed out that the case histories of "spectacular memory successes" are anecdotal and difficult to verify independently and there are no controlled studies confirming these reports. Scientific Affairs, *supra*, at 1919. In addition, some in the clinical community express reservations concerning the theory of memory repression, or at least the phenomenon's prevalence. *See* Julie M. Murray, "Repression, Memory, and Suggestibility," 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 477, 505-08 (1995). Furthermore, we are highly skeptical of the belief in the clinician's ability to "weed out most patently groundless claims" because childhood sexual abuse often "fits like a tailor-made glove" to certain psychiatric disorders. Kanovitz, *supra*, at 1242. Some therapists may be too eager to find patterns of behavior demonstrative of childhood sexual abuse. *See* Murray, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 507-08. *But cf.* Colette M. Smith, "Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse," 18 Seattle Univ. L. Rev. 51, 61 (1994) (noting that Harvard Medical School psychiatrist Judith Herman "believes that therapists rarely wield enough power over patients

to impose false memories on them"). Therefore, even though there may be important distinctions between the use of hypnosis to enhance memories of witnessed events and the use of hypnosis to retrieve repressed memories, given the lack of empirical studies as to the latter and the complicated nature of hypnotically-induced recall, we are not willing to assume that the risks of suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening are significantly reduced when the hypnosis that triggers the testimony is used for therapeutic purposes.

G. *Totality-of-the-Circumstances Approach*

Based on our review of the literature and the caselaw, we conclude that the district court was correct to reject a per se rule of admissibility or inadmissibility. A per se rule of exclusion or inclusion is too blunt a tool with which to address the concerns regarding the reliability of post-hypnotic testimony or the concerns that people who have been sexually abused may lose an opportunity to bring suit against their abusers.

To be sure, the exclusion of such testimony in every case avoids the problems of unreliability, but it ignores Federal Rule of Evidence 601, which "abolished almost all grounds for witness disqualification based on new assumptions that took a more optimistic view of witness reliability and jury perceptiveness." Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 124, 129. In addition, we believe that it risks the elimination of reliable testimony. *See State v. Iwakiri*, 682 P.2d 571, 577 (Idaho 1984).

On the other hand, to admit all such testimony without pause, even if the jury is informed of the risks of the potential problems of hypnotically-enhanced testimony, creates the danger of having a lay jury speculate as to

the effects of the hypnosis in the case before it. As a result, such an approach seems to us inadequate to protect defendants from unfounded charges in either criminal or civil suits. *See* Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 127-28. While we appreciate the care and sensitivity with which the district court chose its methodology, we nevertheless find its approach too rigid and restrictive and prefer a "totality-of-the-circumstances" approach. First, we believe that to treat the presence or absence of safeguards as the sole criteria of admissibility may not always mitigate the problems associated with hypnotically-refreshed memory, and it may "give hypnosis an aura of reliability which misleads the jury into disregarding the remaining dangers." Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 169-70.

Second, like the Fourth Circuit, we are reluctant to treat the presence of safeguards as a litmus test for determining the reliability of pre-trial hypnosis, since even though the safeguards are relevant to the inquiry, "a court cannot necessarily rest solely on the reliability *vel non* of the hypnosis procedures in ruling on the admissibility of the proffered testimony." *McQueen*, 814 F.2d at 958. Conversely, the absence of safeguards does not compel the conclusion in every case that post-hypnotic testimony is unreliable: "[E]ven if the hypnosis procedures are flawed, a trial or appellate court might discern that a witness' testimony was nonetheless independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis." *Id.*; *see also Iwakiri*, 682 P.2d at 578 ("[M]erely because one of the safeguards was not followed should not result in the automatic exclusion of the entire testimony.").

Thus, we believe that the rule of admissibility should be more flexible than the one suggested by the district court and we therefore find preferable the approaches

taken by the Eighth Circuit in *Sprynczynatyk*, 771 F.2d at 1112, and the Fourth Circuit in *McQueen*, 814 F.2d at 951. In *Sprynczynatyk*, the Eighth Circuit required pretrial hearings to assess the procedures used in hypnosis to determine "in view of all the circumstances," whether the testimony was sufficiently reliable and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect. 771 F.2d at 1122.

In *McQueen*, the Fourth Circuit required the trial court to

> conduct a balanced inquiry to determine if the testimony had a basis that was independent of the dangers associated with hypnosis—in other words, a balanced inquiry to determine whether a witness' memory and ability to testify from it was distorted by the earlier hypnosis. The balanced inquiry . . . cannot be circumscribed by narrow considerations, and . . . must be determined by a detailed factual analysis on a case-by-case basis.

814 F.2d at 958. Despite flawed hypnosis procedures, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the hypnotically-enhanced testimony of a witness to a murder was admissible because "considerable circumstantial evidence corroborated [the] testimony," *id.* at 959, her testimony "exhibited the characteristics normally expected from a witness recalling details of facts five years after their occurrence," and there was "no indication of a memory unshakably frozen by hypnosis," *id.* at 961.

In conducting a case-by-case analysis, the district court should consider the following non-exclusive list of factors. First, it should evaluate the purpose of the hypnosis: whether it was to refresh a witness's memory of an accident or crime or whether it was conducted as part

of therapy. In the former instance, the subject may feel pressured to remember details, to aid the criminal investigation, whereas when the subject has undergone therapy to explore the sources of her psychological ailments, she may be less inclined to confabulate or describe a complete coherent story. In the latter case, however, the court should be mindful of the possibility that the subject may have received subtle suggestions from her therapist that abuse or other traumas could be at the root of her problems. Thus, a second important consideration is whether the witness received any suggestions from the hypnotist or others prior to or during hypnosis such as a theory of the cause of the subject's ailments or key information relevant to the investigation for which she underwent hypnosis. A third and related factor is the presence or absence of a permanent record, which can help the court ascertain whether suggestive procedures were used. Ideally, the session should be videotaped or audiotaped. Fourth, a court should consider whether the hypnotist was appropriately qualified by training in psychology or psychiatry. A fifth factor is whether corroborating evidence exists to support the reliability of the hypnotically-refreshed memories. Sixth, evidence of the subject's hypnotizability may also be relevant. A highly hypnotizable subject may be more prone to confabulate and more susceptible to suggestion. Seventh, the court should consider any expert evidence offered by the parties as to the reliability of the procedures used in the case. Finally, a pretrial evidentiary hearing is highly desirable to enable the parties to present expert evidence and to test credibility through cross-examination.

After consideration of all of the relevant circumstances, the trial court should weigh the factors in favor and against the reliability of the hypnosis procedure in

the exercise of its discretion whether to admit the post-hypnotic testimony. Finally, we add that the party attempting to admit the hypnotically-enhanced testimony bears the burden of persuading the district court that the balance tips in favor of admissibility. *Hurd*, 432 A.2d at 97.

H. *Application of Admissibility Approach to this Case*

While we conclude that the test for admissibility adopted by the district court in this case was insufficiently flexible, and while we believe that it would have been more appropriate for the district judge to have conducted an evidentiary hearing prior to issuing his ruling, we nonetheless affirm the district court's in limine ruling and subsequent summary judgment. Since in our view the factors before the district court weighed decisively against the admissibility of Borawick's testimony, we are convinced that if the district court had followed our test, it would have necessarily reached the same conclusion. We see no point in remanding the case so that the district court can reach the same finding.

First, Borawick's assertions notwithstanding, it is beyond question that St. Regis lacked adequate professional qualifications as a hypnotist. While a panoply of academic qualifications is not necessary in all circumstances for one to qualify as an expert, there should be a general presumption in favor of appropriate academic credentials. The district court's finding that St. Regis was not properly qualified finds ample support in the record: his formal education ended with a high school diploma; he had no formal training in psychiatry or psychotherapy; his hypnotic technique used an experimental cranial electronic stimulator; he did not read the

professional literature; and his work experience prior to being a hypnotist at Pacific Medical Center was intermittent. The fact that Dr. Peters, a medical doctor, self-servingly stated that he considered St. Regis to be qualified is not enough to disturb the district court's determination.

There was also no permanent record of the procedures that St. Regis used; no videotapes, audiotapes, or even contemporaneously-drafted medical reports existed. 842 F. Supp. at 1507. As a result, the district court was not provided with any means, independent of St. Regis's testimony, to determine whether or not he was inadvertently suggestive in his approach or otherwise used suspect techniques in conducting the hypnosis. Without such a record, expert testimony would have been of little value, since experts similarly would have had no basis on which to evaluate the actual procedures St. Regis used.

Finally, we receive no comfort from the fact that St. Regis read excerpts from Borawick's deposition transcript prior to testifying himself. Given that he is not qualified and that the record lacks any basis on which to assess the reliability of the procedures he used, this circumstance further undermines the value, if any, of his testimony.

Our conclusion is reinforced by the inherent incredibility of Borawick's allegations. In this case, Borawick has levelled fanciful accusations of sexual abuse against numerous persons other than the defendants in this matter that include persons both familiar and unfamiliar to her. For example, Borawick allegedly recalls being raped and sexually abused at the age of three during rituals by men whom she believed to be members of the Masons. She also purports to recollect several incidents in which

she was drugged by injection as well as an incident in which she was forced to drink blood at a ritual involving a dead pig, incense, chanting, and people dressed in black gowns. Several additional incidents of a similarly unlikely nature involving sexual abuse by others are included in the sealed record. That Borawick has made these far-fetched, uncorroborated accusations against others, in addition to the defendants, erodes our confidence in the allegations against Morrie and Christine Shay and properly weighs against the admissibility of her hypnotically-induced memories.

We note that the district court failed to consider the evidence that Borawick offered as corroboration in her motion for reconsideration, including letters from her sister alleging abuse. In the face of the record before the district court, we find that Borawick's corroborating evidence was simply too weak to overcome the very strong evidence against admissibility. Consequently, we affirm the district court's ruling as to the in limine motion.

II. The Application of *Daubert*

Borawick also contends that the district court's in limine ruling was not consistent with *Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals*, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), in which the Supreme Court held that the test set forth in *Frye v. United States*, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. *Id.* at 2793. In determining "the proper standard for the admission of expert testimony," *id.* at 2792, the Court noted that several of the Federal Rules of Evidence applied. Rather than impose a rigid framework of criteria that must be met in order for the testimony to be admissible, the Court ruled that judges must determine whether an expert's testimony "is scientifically valid" by

examining 1) whether the theory had been tested, 2) whether it had been subjected to peer review, 3) what the potential or known rate of error is, 4) what sort of standards control the technique's operation, and 5) whether the theory or technique has generally been accepted. *Id.* at 2796-97. This inquiry, the Court emphasized, should be flexible. *Id.* at 2797. In giving trial judges "the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand," *id.* at 2799, the Court assigned trial judges "a gatekeeping role" for the admissibility of scientific evidence. *Id.* at 2798.

We do not believe that *Daubert* is directly applicable to the issue here since *Daubert* concerns the admissibility of data derived from scientific techniques or expert opinions. The issue before us is whether Borawick is a competent witness, *see* Federal Practice, *supra*, § 6011, at 125-26, or whether her lay testimony is admissible, *Valdez*, 722 F.2d at 1200-01. Under either characterization, the question does not concern the admissibility of experimental data or expert opinions. *See id. But see Tuttle*, 780 P.2d at 1211 (rejecting the State's position that the issue only concerns the admissibility of testimony from a lay eyewitness as opposed to an expert on the basis that "the hypnotically enhanced testimony given by the witness is the product of scientific intervention").

Even though *Daubert* does not provide direct guidance, our decision today is informed by the principles underlying the Supreme Court's holding. First, by loosening the strictures on scientific evidence set by *Frye*, *Daubert* reinforces the idea that there should be a presumption of admissibility of evidence. Second, it emphasizes the need for flexibility in assessing whether

evidence is admissible. Rather than using rigid "safeguards" for determining whether testimony should be admitted, the Court's approach is to permit the trial judge to weigh the various considerations pertinent to the issue in question. Third, *Daubert* allows for the admissibility of scientific evidence, even if not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, provided its reliability has independent support. Finally, the Court expressed its faith in the power of the adversary system to test "shaky but admissible" evidence, *Daubert*, 113 S. Ct. at 2798, and advanced a bias in favor of admitting evidence short of that solidly and indisputably proven to be reliable. Finally, we note that, even if *Daubert* were of direct application, nothing in *Daubert* is inconsistent with our outlined approach.

CONCLUSION

We have considered the Due Process and Seventh Amendment claims raised by Borawick and conclude that they are meritless. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons we affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the complaint.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

At a Seated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 17th day of October, one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five.

PRESENT: HON. ELLSWORTH A. VAN GRAAFEILAND
HON. JOHN M. WALKER, JR.
HON. JOSE A. CABRANES,
Circuit Judges.

Docket no.(s): 94-7584

JOAN S. BORAWICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MORRIE SHAY and CHRISTINE SHAY,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of said district court be and it hereby is affirmed in accordance with the opinion of this Court, with costs to be taxed against the appellant.

For the Court
GEORGE LANGE III, Clerk

By: /s/

Beth J. Meador
Administrative Attorney

A TRUE COPY
GEORGE LANGE III CLERK
/s/

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE
40 FOLEY SQUARE
NEW YORK 10007

GEORGE LANGE III
CLERK

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 29th day of December one thousand nine hundred and ninety-five.

Joan S. Borawick
Plaintiff-Appellant
v
Dkt no. 95-7584
Morrie Shay and Christine Shay,
Defendants-Appellees.

A petition for rehearing containing a suggestion that the action be reheard in banc having been filed herein by the appellant Joan S. Borawick.

Upon consideration by the panel that decided the appeal, it is Ordered that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is further noted that the suggestion for rehearing in banc has been transmitted to the judges for the court in regular active service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

FOR THE COURT
GEORGE LANGE III, Clerk
By: s/s
Beth J. Meador,
Administrative Attorney

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JOAN S. BORAWICK	:	5:92 CV00033 (TFGD)
v.	:	
MORRIE SHAY AND CHRISTINE SHAY	:	DATE: NOVEMBER 17, 1992

RECOMMENDED RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

On January 24, 1992, plaintiff Joan S. Borawick commenced this diversity action against defendants Morrie Shay and Christine Shay; in her two-count complaint, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for defendants' alleged willful, wanton, and malicious sexual assault, sexual molestation, and sexual exploitation of plaintiff. Defendants deny plaintiff's allegations and allege as affirmative defenses two Connecticut statutes of limitation.

On March 31, 1992, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings and brief in support (Dkt. ##17-18).[1] Plaintiff filed her brief in opposition on April 20, 1992 (Dkt. #24.)[2] On June 10, 1992, plaintiff sent this Magistrate Judge a

[1] Attached to the brief were the six exhibits: copies of Public Act Nos. 86-401 & 86-403 (Exh. A); copy of Public Act No. 91-240 (Exh. B); defendants' Local Rule 9(c) Statement (Exh. C); copy of Bell v. Swiercz, Dkt. No. 239508, 7 CSCR 355 (Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1992) Exh. D); copy of plaintiff's discovery responses, dated March 30, 1992 (Exh. E); affidavit of defendant Morrie Shay (Exh. F).

[2] Attached to plaintiff's brief were seven exhibits: copy of the 1986 version of Conn. Gen. Stat. §52-577d (App. A); copy of the 1991 version of § 52-577d (App. B); copy of the legislative history of 1986 passage of § 52-577d (App. C); copy of the legislative history of 1991 amendment of § 52-577d (App. D); copy of

letter, to which was attached a copy of Roberts v. Caton, Dkt. No. 307859, 6 Conn. L.Rptr. No. 14, at 398 (Super. Ct. May 143, 1992). Defendants filed a supplemental memorandum on June 22, 1992, responding to plaintiff's letter (Dkt. #56).

For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion is denied.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual allegations in plaintiff's complaint are as follows: plaintiff, a citizen of California, is the maternal niece of the defendants, who are citizens of Connecticut; she was born on February 5, 1957 (Complaint First Count ¶¶1-4).

During the summers of 1961 and 1964, when plaintiff was four and seven years old, she was the guest of defendants at their home in Westport, Connecticut (id. First Count ¶6). Plaintiff alleges that in the summer of 1961, both defendants sexually assaulted, sexually molested, and sexually exploited her (id. First Count ¶7, Second Count ¶2). Plaintiff further alleges that during the summer of 1964, defendant Christine Shay sexually assaulted, sexually molested, and sexually exploited her (id. First Count ¶7). Plaintiff alleges defendants acted willfully, wantonly, and maliciously (id. First Count ¶8, Second Count ¶3). Plaintiff alleges multiple injuries as a result of these alleged incidents (id. First Count ¶¶9-12, Second Count ¶¶4-7).

II DISCUSSION

The standards applicable to a motion for judgment on the pleadings under F.R. Civ. P. 12(c) are identical to those for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6). Ad Hoc Comm. of the Baruch Black & Hispanic Alumni Association v. Bernard m. Baruch College, 835 F.2d 980, 982 (2d Cir. 1987); Losacco v. City of Middletown, 745 F. Supp. 812, 814 (D. Conn. 1990). A

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the slip opinion in Bell v. Swiercz (App. E); copy of M. v. F., Dkt. No. 287194, 12 Conn. L.T. No. 3, at 21 (Super Ct. June 25, 1985) (App. F); copy of Ill. Code Civ. Proc. § 13-202.2 (Exh. G).

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) tests only the insufficiency of the complaint. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236-37 (1974). Dismissal is inappropriate "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). The complaint's allegations are assumed to be true and all reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the opposing party. Scheuer, supra, 416 U.S. at 236. "In determining the adequacy of a claim..., consideration is limited to facts stated on the face of the complaint, in documents appended to the complaint or incorporated in the complaint by reference, and to matters of which judicial notice may be taken." Allen v. WestPoint-Pepperell, Inc., 945 F.2d 40,44 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).

The parties agree that this court, sitting in diversity, must apply the statutes of limitations of the forum state, Connecticut. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 745 (1980). Defendants argue plaintiff's complaint is barred by two Connecticut statutes of limitations, namely Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 52-577 and 52-584.

A. SECTIONS 52-577 & 52-577d

Section 52-577 always has provided for a three-year limitation period applicable to actions based on tort. The parties disagree as to whether § 52-577d, entitled "limitation of action for damages to minor caused by sexual abuse, exploitation, or assault," applies to this case. The statute, as it currently is written,[3] provides:

> Notwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577, no action to recover damages for personal injury to a minor, including emotional distress, caused by sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault may be brought by

[3]Section 52-577d originally was enacted in 1986 and provided a two-year limitation period from the date of majority, except no action could be brought more than seven years from the date of the act. The act was amended in 1991 to provide the seventeen-year limitations period.

such person later than seventeen years from the date such person attains the age of majority.

Plaintiff argues that the current version of § 52-577d applies retroactively to her case.

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 55-3 explicitly provides: "No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person..., shall be construed to have a retrospective effect." Section 52-577d contains no express language regarding its prospective or retrospective effect. Despite fairly extensive legislative discussion on this statute (see Apps. C-D), there is precious little in the legislative history regarding retroactivity. To a forty-seven-year-old incest victim testifying before the Judiciary Committee, Representative Wollenberg commented: "I think this bill is maybe too late for you..." (id. at 1135); the witness acknowledged that she was beyond the statute of limitations (id. at 1136). During the legislative debate on this bill, Representative Tulisano remarked that "the main focus" of the amendment is to "extend[]" the statute "to individuals potentially 35 years old...." (id. at 4706). Representative Tulisano made mention of women who had become "dysfunctional in the[ir] marriages because of prior incidents and the only way [their husbands] thought they might be able to help somebody become whole was to be able to bring a cause of action against the perpetrator." (id. at 4706-07). None of these statements, however, shed any light on the legislative intent with respect to retroactive application of § 52-577d.

The seminal Connecticut case on the retroactive application of a statute is Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 286 A.2d 308 (1971), which considered Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-39, the statute of limitations for a mechanics lien. The court held as follows:

> The determination of whether a statute is retrospective presents a question of legislative intent, and where there is no specific provision to that effect, the question becomes one of presumed intent. In this instance, § 49-39

> is silent as to its retroactive applicability. Where that is the situation, the rule to be applied to determine whether it is prospective or retroactive, depends, in some measure, on whether it affects substantive or procedural matters.

Id. at 195 (citation omitted). the court continued: "Such a statute is generally considered to be procedural especially where, as here, the statute contains only a limitation as to time with respect to a right of action and does not itself create the right of action." Id. See also Bauer v. Johns-Manville Corp., 599 F. Supp. 33, 35 (D. Conn. 1984); Collucci v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 585 F. Supp. 529, 531-32 (D. Conn. 1984); Gormley v. State Employees retirement Comm'n, 216 Conn. 523, 527-532, 582 A.2d 764 (1990); Mulrooney v. Wambolt, 215 Conn. 211, 216-17, 575 A.2d 996 (1990); Champagne v. Raybestos-Manhattan, inc., 212 Conn. 509, 525-26, 562 A.2d 1110 (1989).

Contrary to the defendants' position, § 52-577d is not substantive, for it does not create a right of action to recover damages for sexual misconduct, but merely creates the appropriate statute of limitations for such claim. Section 52-577d carves out an exception to the general statute of limitations for actions based on tort. Recognizing unique problems associated with the tort of sexual abuse, the legislature extended the three-year period under § 52-577 to seventeen years under § 52-577d (see Apps. C-D).

Based on the foregoing line of reasoning, two recent Connecticut Superior Court decisions have applied § 52-577d retroactively. In Bell v. Swiercz, Dkt. No. 239508, 7 CSCR 335 (Super. Ct. Mar. 5, 1992), the court applied § 52-577d retroactively in granting plaintiff's prejudgment attachment request. The court found that § 52-577d is procedural in nature and "there is nothing in the legislative history to defeat the presumption that this particular statute should be given retroactive application." Id. at 336. Two months later, in Roberts v. Caton, Dkt. No. 308859, 6 Conn. l. Rptr. No. 14, at 398 (Super. Ct. May 13, 1992), the court denied a motion to dismiss a sexual assault claim because it found that § 52-577d applied retroactively

to the plaintiff's claim. The court stated:

> While a seventeen (17) year statute of limitations is rather unique to say the least and may well generate vigorous argument as to perceived excess, the rules of construction and our decisions addressing those rules mandate that such retroactivity be accorded this statute. Id. at 399.

Section 52-577d begins with the phrase, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of section 52-577...." (emphasis added). Because §52-577d may be applied retroactively, plaintiff's claims are not barred by § 52-577.

Defendants argue that even should this court interpret § 52-577d as procedural, the statute should still not be applied retroactively. As the Connecticut Supreme Court observed in Jones Destruction, supra: "even if the statute is procedural, it will not be applied retroactively if considerations of good sense and justice dictate that it not be so applied." 161 Conn. at 196. In Jones Destruction, the court found such considerations to be present, where the amendment placed additional hurdles before a plaintiff:

> Good sense and judgment can hardly be said to dictate penalizing a plaintiff for failure to obtain a final judgment within a certain time limit due to at least some factors beyond the plaintiff's control. Hence, the conclusion is inescapable that the statute should not be construed as retroactive to pending actions such as the one here in issue.

Id. at 197 (citations omitted).

Such is not the case here. As Apps. C-D indicate, during the public hearing and legislative debates, the legislators were made aware, and discussed amongst themselves, that memories of sexual misconduct often are repressed for years by the alleged victims.

The Court is sensitive to defendants' legitimate concerns that they will be unable to remember, or substantiate, events which transpired perhaps decades earlier. The substantial passage of time works to the detriment of the plaintiff as well, upon whom the burden of proof lies. "Good sense and judgment" thus dictate that § 52-577d be applied retroactively, in keeping with the legislature's motivations behind the initial passage and amendment of § 52-577d.

Defendants' due process arguments fail as well. Defendants are not being denied notice, an opportunity to be heard, and a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1970).

An underlying principle behind statutes of limitations "is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale claims, concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution." Lametta v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 139 Conn. 218, 221, 92 A.2d 731 (1952). Nevertheless, the law regarding due process and retroactive statutes of limitation is clear:

> "The Fourteenth Amendment does not make an act of state legislation void merely because it has some retrospective operation. What it does forbid is taking of life, liberty or property without due process of law.... Assuming that statutes of limitation like other types of legislation, could be so manipulated that their retroactive effects would offend the Constitution, certainly it cannot be said that lifting the bar of a statute of limitation so as to restore a remedy lost through mere lapse of time is per se an offense against the Fourteenth Amendment."

Electrical Workers v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229, 243-44 (1976) (citation and emphasis omitted). Therefore, retroactive application of § 52-577d does not violate defendants' rights to procedural due process.

B. SECTION 52-584

In 1961 and 1964, when the incidents giving rise to this lawsuit allegedly occurred, § 52-584 provided a one-year limitations period for negligence actions:

> No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, ...shall be brought but within one year from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered.

(emphasis added).[4] Defendants similarly argue that plaintiff's lawsuit is barred by this statute, in light of plaintiff's description of defendants' alleged actions as "wanton" (Complaint First Count ¶8, Second count ¶3). During the legislative debates, Representative Woodcock described sexual abuse as "willful, wonton [sic] and reckless acts." (App. C., at 6339). It is well established that "[w]hen there are two conflicting sections of a general compilation or code of statute laws, that section should prevail which is derived from a source that can be considered as the last expression of the lawmaking power in enacting separate statutes upon the same subject." Tuohey v. Martinjak, 119 Conn. 500, 507-08, 177 A.2d 721 (1935) (citation omitted). Section 52-577d, which was enacted in 1986 and amended as recently as October 1991, is clearly the more recent expression of legislative intent regarding sexual abuse, sexual assault, or sexual exploitation.

Therefore, § 52-584 does not apply to this cause of action, despite plaintiff's use of the word "wanton" in her complaint.

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[4]The current version of § 52-584 provides for a two-year statute of limitations for negligence actions and applies only to injuries sustained on or after October 1, 1969.

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. #17) is denied.

See 28 U.S.C. §636(b) **(written objections to ruling must be filed within ten days after service of same)**; F.R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; Rule 2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrates, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small v. Secretary, H& HS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) **(failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge's recommended ruling may preclude further appeal to Second Circuit).**

Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 17th day of November, 1992.

/s/_____
Joan Glazer Margolis
U.S. Magistrate Judge

JANUARY 27, 1993. Civ. No. 5:92CV00033 (TFGD).
After careful review and over objection, Magistrate Judge Margolis' well-reasoned Recommended Ruling is hereby AFFIRMED, APPROVED and ADOPTED.

SO ORDERED.

/s/_____
T.F. Gilroy Daly, U.S.D.J.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

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JOAN S. BORAWICK 5:92CV00033(TFGD)

v.

MORRIE SHAY, ET AL. DATE: MARCH 8, 1994

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RECOMMENDED RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Familiarity is presumed with this Magistrate Judge's Ruling on Defendants' Motion in Limine, filed March 24, 1993 (Dkt. #95), Supplemental Ruling on Defendants' Motion In Limine, filed May 26, 1993 (Dkt. #112), and Ruling on Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, filed August 18, 1993 (Dkt. #120), all of which were approved by U.S. District Judge T.F. Gilroy Daly on January 10, 1994, over plaintiff's objection.

Currently pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment (see Dkt. ##131, 135-141). On February 22, 1994, plaintiff filed her response (Dkt. #133), in which she indicated that she is unable to oppose defendants' motion, in light of the three previous rulings. This result is an unfortunate one, in that plaintiff apparently has be unable to develop any independent evidence (such as the testimony of her sister) to corroborate her claims.

Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #135) is granted.

See 28 U.S.C. §636(b) (written objectoins to ruling must be filed within ten days after service of same); F.R. Civ.P. 6(a), 6(e) & 72; Rule 2 of the Local Rules for United States Magistrate

Judges, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut; Small v. Secretary, H&HS, 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (failure to file timely objection to Magistrate Judge's recommended ruling may preclude further appeal to Second Circuit).

Dated at New Haven, Connecticut, this 8th day of March, 1994.

Joan Glazer Margolis
U.S. Magistrate Judge

May 6, 1994. Civ. No. 5:92CV00033 (TGFD).
After careful review, and over objection, Magistrate Judge Margolis' recommended Ruling is hereby AFFIRMED, APPROVED and ADOPTED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file on this matter.

So Ordered.

/s/
T.F. Gilroy Daly, U.S.D.S.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JOAN S. BORAWICK

v. 5:92CV00033 TFGD

MORRIE SHAY, et al

JUDGMENT

This cause came on for consideration of Defendants' motion for summary judgment by the Honorable Joan G. Margolis, U.S. Magistrate Judge and the Honorable T.F. Gilroy Daly, U. S. District Judge, and

The Court having filed its recommended ruling granting the defendants' motion and said ruling having been affirmed, approved and adopted over objection,

It is therefore ORDERED and ADJUDGED that judgment enter in favor of the defendants Morrie and Christine Shay.

Dated at Waterbury, Connecticut, this 10th day of May, 1994.

KEVIN F. ROWE, Clerk

By /s/_____
Deputy Clerk

Federal Rules Evidence, Rule 412, 28 U.S.C.

Sex Offense cases; Relevance of Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition

(a) **Evidence generally inadmissible.**

The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions (b) and (c):

(1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior.

(2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition.

(b) Exceptions

(2) In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and of unfair prejudice to any party. Evidence of an alleged victim's reputation is admissible only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.

(c) Procedure to determine admissibility.

(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must:

(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different time for filing or permits filing during trial; and

(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or, when appropriate, the alleged victim's guardian or representative.

(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule this court must conduct a hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend and be heard. The motion, related papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders otherwise.

42 U.S.C.§ 13981. Civil rights

(a) **Purpose.** Pursuant to the affirmative power of Congress to enact this subtitle under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as well as under section 8 of Article I of the Constitution, it is the purpose of this subtitle to protect the civil rights of victims of gender motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action of victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.

(b) **Right to be free from crimes of violence.** All persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence motivated by gender (as defined in subsection (d)).

(c) **Cause of action.** A person (including a person who acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and thus deprives another of the right declared in subsection (b) shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.

(d) **Definitions.** For purposes of this section--

(1) the term "crime of violence motivated by gender" means a crime of violence committed because of gender or on the basis of gender, and due, at least in part, to an animus based on the victim's gender; and

(2) the term "crime of violence" means--

(A) an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the person or that would constitute a felony against property if

the conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses described in section 16 of title 18, United States Code, whether or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, prosecution, or conviction and whether or not those acts were committed in the special maritime, territorial, or prison jurisdiction of the United States; and

(B) includes an act or series of acts that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such action is taken.

CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 667.83. Ritual abuse; Sentence enhancement

(a) When a person is convicted of a felony violation of Section 207, 261, 264.1, 273a, 273d, 286, 288a, or 289 committed against a child under the age of 18 years or a violation of Section 288 committed against a child of the age designated in that statute, where the offense was committed as part of a ceremony, rite, or any similar observance, the person shall be punished by an additional term of three years in addition and consecutive to that violation.

(b) For purposes of this section, a "ceremony, rite, or any similar observance" shall mean nay of the following:

(1) Actual or simulated torture, mutilation, or sacrifice of any mammal.

(2) Forced ingestion, or external application of human or animal urine, feces, flesh, blood, or bones.

(3) Placement of a living child into a coffin, open grave, or other confined area containing animal remains or a human corpse or remains.

(c) This section shall not apply to:

(1) Lawful agriculture, animal husbandry, food preparation, or wild game hunting and fishing practices and specifically the branding or identification of livestock.

(2) The lawful medical practice of circumcision or any ceremony related thereto.

(3) Any state or federally approved, licensed, or funded research project.

(d) The enhancement charged in violation of subdivision (a) shall be proven by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness

and corroborating circumstances.

(e) The following provisions govern the imposition of this enhancement:

(1) Only one enhancement shall be imposed per victim per incident.

(2) If there are two or more victims, one enhancement may be imposed per victim per incident.

(f) the Department of Justice shall submit to the Legislature on or before January 1, 1998, a report compiling data from the Department of Justice form 8715 containing information relating to this section that has been reported into the Department of Justice automated criminal history system and is available on the longitudinal file.

(g) Persons responsible for the completion of the Department of Justice form 8715 shall submit the form to the Attorney General in a timely manner. In addition, those persons shall record all cases in which enhancements are charged under this section and the disposition of those cases.

(h) This section shall not be construed to infringe in any way upon the rights and practices of legitimate religions.

(i) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 1999, and as of that date is repealed unless a later enacted statute, that is enacted before January 1, 1999, deletes or extends that date.

(4) For the purpose of this section, "child" means any person under eighteen (18) years of age.

PENAL CODE
TITLE 18. CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
TITLE 15. CHILDREN AND VULNERABLE ADULTS

IDAHO CODE § 18-1506A (1994)

§18-1506A. Ritualized abuse of a child - Exclusions - Penalties - Definition

(1) A person is guilty of a felony when he commits any of the following acts with, upon, or in the presence of a child as part of a ceremony, rite or any similar observance:

(a) Actually or in simulation, tortures, mutilates or sacrifices any warm-blooded animal or human being;

(b) Forces ingestion, injection or other application of any narcotic, drug, hallucinogen or anaesthetic for the purpose of dulling sensitivity, cognition, recollection of, or resistance to any criminal activity;

(c) Forces ingestion, or external application of human or animal urine, feces, flesh, blood, bones, body secretions, nonprescribed drugs or chemical compounds;

(d) Involves the child in a mock, unauthorized or unlawful marriage ceremony with another person or representation of any force or deity [deity], followed by sexual contact with the child;

(e) Places a living child into a coffin or open grave containing a human corpse or remains;

(f) Threatens death or serious harm to a child, his parents, family, pets or friends which instills a well-founded fear in the child that the threat will be carried out; or

(g) Unlawfully dissects, mutilates, or incinerates a human corpse.

(2) The provisions of this section shall not be construed to apply to:

(a) Lawful agricultural, animal husbandry, food preparation or wild game hunting and fishing practices and specifically the branding or identification of livestock;

(b) The lawful medical practice of circumcision or any ceremony related thereto; or

(c) Any state or federally approved, licensed or funded research project.

(3) The penalty upon conviction of a first offense shall be imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not to exceed fifteen (15) years. Upon conviction of a second or subsequent offense, the penalty shall be for a term not more than life imprisonment.

(4) For the purposes of this section, "child" means any person under eighteen (18) years of age.

ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES, Chapter 720, Section 5/12-33

Sec. 5/12-33. Ritualized abuse of a child. (a) A person is guilty of ritualized abuse of a child when he or she commits any of the following acts with, upon, or in the presence of a child as part of a ceremony, rite or any similar observance:

(1) actually or in simulating, tortures, mutilates, or sacrifices any warm-blooded animal or human being;

(2) forces ingestion, injection or other application of any narcotic, drug, hallucinogen or anaesthetic for the purpose of dulling sensitivity, cognition, recollection of, or resistance to any criminal activity;

(3) forces ingestion, or external application, of human or animal urine, feces, flesh, blood, bones, body secretions, nonprescribed drugs or chemical compounds;

(4) involves the child in a mock, unauthorized or unlawful marriage ceremony with another person or representation of any force or deity, followed by sexual contact with the child;

(5) places a living child into a coffin or open grave containing a human corpse or remains;

(6) threatens death or serious harm to a child, his or her parents, family, pets, or friends that instills a well-founded fear in the child that the threat will be carried out; or

(7) unlawfully dissects, mutilates, or incinerates a human corpse.

(b) The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to apply to:

(1) lawful agricultural, animal husbandry, food

preparation, or wild game hunting and fishing practices and specifically the branding or identification of livestock;

(2) the lawful medical practice of circumcision or any ceremony related to circumcision;

(3) any state or federally approved, licensed, or funded research project; or

(4) the ingestion of animal flesh or blood in the performance of a religious service or ceremony.

(c) Ritualized abuse of a child is a Class 1 felony for a first offense. A second or subsequent conviction for ritualized abuse of a child is a Class X felony for which the offender may be sentenced to a term of natural life imprisonment.

(d) For the purposes of this Section, "child" means any person under 18 years of age.

LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES
La. R.S. 14:107.1 (1995)

107.1. Ritualistic acts

A. (1) The legislature hereby finds that this enactment is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, morals, safety, and welfare and for the support of state government and its existing public institutions.

(2) The legislature further recognizes that:

(a) The preamble to the Constitution of Louisiana affirmatively states "We, the people of Louisiana, grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political, economic, and religious liberties we enjoy, and desiring to protect individual rights to life, liberty, and property; afford opportunity for the fullest development of the individual; assure equality of rights; promote the health, safety, education, and welfare of the people; maintain a representative and orderly government; ensure domestic tranquility; provide for the common defense; and secure the blessings of freedom and justice to ourselves an our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution."

(b) The state, under its police power, may enact laws in order to promote public peace, health, morals, and safety.

B. (1) For purposes of this Subsection, "ritualistic acts" means those acts undertaken as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, performance, or practice that result in or are intended to result in:

(a) The mutilation, dismemberment, torture, abuse, or sacrifice of animals.

(b) The ingestion of human or animal blood or human or animal waste.

(2) The acts defined in this Subsection are hereby determined to

be destructive of the peace, health, morals, and safety of the citizens of this state and are hereby prohibited.

(3) Any person committing, attempting to commit, or conspiring with another to commit a ritualistic act may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

C. (1) No person shall commit ritualistic mutilation, dismemberment, or torture of a human as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, performance, or practice.

(2) No person shall commit ritualistic sexual abuse of children or of physically or mentally disabled adults as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, performance, or practice.

(3) No person shall commit ritualistic psychological abuse of children or of physically or mentally disabled adults as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, performance, or practice.

(4) Any person who commits, attempts to commit, or conspires with another to commit a violation of this Subsection shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not less than five nor more than twenty-five years and may be fined not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.

D. Each violation that occurs under the provisions of this Section shall be considered a separate violation.

E. The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to apply to generally accepted agricultural or horticultural practices and specifically the branding or identification of livestock.

F. The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to apply to any state or federally approved, licensed, or funded research project.

MONTANA CODE Ann., §27-2-217 (1994)

27-2-217. Tort actions - ritual abuse of minor.

(1) An action based on intentional conduct brought by a person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as a result of ritual abuse of a minor must be commenced not later than:

(a) 3 years after the act of ritual abuse of a minor that is alleged to have caused the injury; or

(b) 3 years after the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury was caused by the act of ritual abuse of a minor.

(2) It is not necessary for a plaintiff to establish which act, in a series of acts of ritual abuse of a minor, caused the injury that is the subject of the suit. The plaintiff may compute the period referred to in subsection (1) (a) from the date of the last act by the same perpetrator.

(3) As used in this section, "ritual abuse of a minor" means any act committed against a plaintiff who was less than 18 years of age at the time the act occurred and that would have been a violation of 45-5-627.

(4) The provisions of 27-2-401 apply to this section.

TITLE 45 CRIMES
CHAPTER 5 OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON
Part 6 Offenses Against the Family
Mont. Code Anno., §45-5-627 (1994)

45-5-627. Ritual abuse of minor -- exceptions -- penalty

(1) A person commits the offense of ritual abuse of a minor if the person purposely or knowingly and as part of any ceremony, rite, or ritual or of any training or practice for any ceremony, rite, or ritual:

(a) has sexual intercourse without consent with a person less than 16 years of age; commits assault, aggravated assault, or felony assault against a victim less than 16 years of age; or kills a person less than 16 years of age;

(b) actually or by simulation tortures, mutilates, or sacrifices an animal or person in the presence of the minor;

(c) dissects, mutilates, or incinerates a human corpse or remains in the presence of the minor;

(d) forces upon the minor or upon another person in the presence of a minor the ingestion or the external bodily application of human or animal urine, feces, flesh, blood, bone, or bodily secretions or drugs or chemical compounds;

(e) places a living minor or another living person in the presence of a minor in a coffin or open grave that is empty or that contains a human corpse or remains; or

(f) threatens the minor or, in the presence of the minor, threatens any person or animal with death or serious bodily harm and the minor reasonably believes that the threat will or may be carried out.

(2) This section does not apply to activities, practices, and procedures otherwise allowed by law.

(3) A person convicted of ritual abuse of a minor shall:

(a) for the first offense, be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 20 years and may be fined not more than $50,000, or both; and

(b) for a second or subsequent offense, be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 40 years and may be fined not more than $50,000, or both.

(4) In addition to any sentence imposed under subsection (3), after determining pursuant to 46-18-242 the financial resources and future ability of the offender to pay restitution, the court shall require the offender, if able, to pay the victim's reasonable costs of counseling that result from the offense. The amount, method, and time of payment must be determined in the same manner as provided for in 46-18-244.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JOAN S. BORAWICK, PLAINTIFF	*	
	*	592CV00033 (TFGD)
	*	
VS.	*	
	*	SEPTEMBER 6, 1994
MORRIE SHAY AND CHRISTINE SHAY, DEFENDANTS	*	

AFFIDAVIT OF [REDACTED]*

I, [REDACTED] being duly sworn, depose and say the following:

1. I am over the age of eighteen years and understand and believe in the obligations of an oath. My date of birth is [REDACTED], 1975.

2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit.

3. I currently reside in the State of [REDACTED] and I am presently enlisted in the armed services. There is a possibility that I may be sent overseas during the upcoming months.

4. I am the [REDACTED] of Joan Borawick and the [REDACTED] of Morrie Shay.

5. [REDACTED]

*The name and other identification information of the affiant has been redacted to protect the victim per C.G.S. §54-86(e).

6. In 1984 or 1985, at approximately the age of 9, I visited my [REDACTED] Morrie Shay and Christine Shay at their home in Westport, Connecticut. I made this visit with [REDACTED] and we stayed at the Shay's home for about two weeks.

7. I have memories of having been sexually abused by Morrie Shay in one of the bedrooms of the Shay home during the visit to Connecticut. I remember Morrie Shay in the bedroom with his pants down and him making sexual contact with me.

8. I also remember playing the game "dress up" with Christine Shay during this visit. The game involved dressing up, putting on make up, and putting on jewelry.

9. I have written many poems concerning my feelings regarding sexual abuse. In 1989 I sent the attached typed version of the lyrics from the song "Live To Tell" to [REDACTED] Joan Borawick.

10. I have also attended therapy and meetings of Incest Survivors Anonymous to get help in coping with my feelings concerning having been sexually abused.

THE AFFIANT

[REDACTED]

State of [REDACTED]

ss.

County of [REDACTED]

Sworn and subscribed to before me the undersigned notary public on this 6th day of September, 1994.

/s/
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
9 Apr. 1995
VIRGINIA M. CLAUSEN

I have a tale to tell sometimes it gets so hard to hide it well,
I was not ready for the fall...to blind to see the writing on the wall.

CHORUS

A man can tell a thousand lies I've learned my lesson well, hope I live to tell the secret I have learned, till then it will burn inside of me.

I know where beauty lives I've seen the it once I know the warmth she gives,
The light that you could never see, it shines inside you can't take that from me.

CHORUS

The truth is never far behind, you kept it hidden well...if I live to tell the secret I knew then it will burn inside of me.

If I ran away I'd never have the strength to go very far, how would they hear the beating of my heart, will it grow cold? When will they learn? How will they hear? How will they know the secret I have learned to hide so well.

CHORUS

(MADONNA - LIVE TO TELL)

"Goodwill, good tidings," angels say,
for Love was born on Christmas Day.
[printed matter]

Dec 25th 94
[handwritten]

JOYOUS CHRISTMAS WISHES
[printed matter]

[handwritten] Love,
/s/

P.S. [handwritten]

Uncle Morrie and Aunt Chris did rape me when I was little also Joan, and I do not care if they disown me or hate me,

your sister, /s/

ENUMCLAW COURIER-HERALD

August 9, 1973

LAWYER CHARGED WITH NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE IN SUMNER GIRL'S DEATH

The death of a 17-year-old Sumner girl in a traffic accident in Enumclaw in the early morning hours of Saturday, July 28, has resulted in the filing of negligent homicide charges against a Midway lawyer who has also served as a Des Moines Municipal Court judge and acting Superior Court judge.

The charges were filed in Superior Court last Friday against Myron L. Borawick, 49, of Midway, Deputy Prosecutor James J. Lamont accused Borawick of driving recklessly and being under the influence of alcohol when his station wagon struck a motorcycle carrying Nora Wray Lamport, 17, on West Griffin Avenue in Enumclaw.

Miss Lamport who was employed at an Auburn restaurant was a passenger on a motorcycle driven by Robin Owen, 22, Auburn. Owen suffered cuts and possible head and body injuries in the accident.

According to Lamont, the accident took place about 2 a.m. on Saturday, July 28, when the motorcycle upon which Owen and Miss Lamport was westbound on Griffin Avenue near the site of the new Catholic church. The charges allege that Borawick's station wagon struck the motorcycle from the rear. Enumclaw police report that the victim was dragged more than 700 feet after the collision. Miss Lamport's body was found under the station wagon after it came to a halt.

An hour and ten minutes prior to the fatal accident, Sgt. D.E. Robinson of the Enumclaw Police Department, had issued Borawick a citation for negligent driving. Robinson said that the Borawick vehicle was traveling east on Griffin toward its intersection with Highway 410 and that Borawick failed to stop at the "Stop" sign and hit a traffic island.

Robinson said he did not arrest Borawick then, but after issuing the citation, escorted him to a restaurant adjacent to King County Park where the attorney said he was to meet a client.

During the next hour, Robinson resumed his patrol and about 2 a.m. while parked in the Stop 'n' Go parking lot, he observed the Owen motorcycle proceeding westbound on Griffin Avenue, with lights on the front and rear of the motorcycle in operation.

Only moments later, Sgt. Robinson observed the station wagon he had stopped and cited earlier traveling at an estimated 50 miles an hour in a 30-mile-an-hour zone. He wheeled the city patrol car in a U-turn in pursuit and arrived at the scene of the accident only seconds after it had occurred.

Borawick was taken to the Enumclaw city jail where he was charged with driving while intoxicated. He was released on his personal recognizance later Saturday morning to Robert Kuvara, his personal attorney.

The defendant told investigators he had been attending a golf tournament and meeting in Enumclaw of the South King County Bar Association prior to the fatal accident.

The negligent homicide charges were filed in Superior Court Friday morning and Superior Court Judge David Soukoup allowed Borawick to be released on his personal recognizance.

The day prior to the accident Borawick had been serving as an acting King County Superior Court judge.

Borawick has maintained a private practice with offices in the Puget Sound National Bank building at Midway. He has served on the bench for some ten years.